Reinventing
Khomeini offers a fresh interpretation of the ideological battles that
paved the way for Mohammad Khatami and the struggle for political reform
in Iran.
These battles did not result from a sudden shift in the ideological
climate, nor did the reform movement completely defy the ideology of
Iran's
Islamic Revolution. Rather, this movement can be traced to the revolution
itself, and to the multiple agendas or "dissonant" vision of authority
espoused by its leaders. Indeed, the revolution's founding father -
Ayatollah Khomeini - was the unwitting author of today's struggles. A far
more complicated figure than conventional depictions suggest, Khomeini
never advocated a coherent ideology. Instead, he sought to mesh a Shi'ite
vision of clerical rule under one "Supreme Leader" with an implicitly
Western notion of mass participatory politics. While Khomeini's charisma
obscured such tensions, his death in 1989 sparked a battle within the
ruling elite to redefine his legacy. Reinventing Khomeini brings this
contest to life by illustrating how Islamic Leftists" tried to push
Khomeini's legacy in a democratic direction. This campaign provoked a
fierce counter-attack from the clerical establishment. Determined to
suppress the West's "cultural onslaught," the conservative clergy
initiated a campaign of repression against the Left. Persecuted by the
very state they had once defended, disillusioned revolutionaries such as
Mohammad Khatami and Abdolkarim Soroush now argued that the only way to
recapture the loyalty of Iran's
alienated youth was to get the state out of the business of imposing
religious dogma or vilifying the West. By embracing this pluralistic
message, Iran's
youth made Khatami's May 1997 election victory possible. Still,
Reinventing Khomeini offers a cautionary view of the future. Arguing
against the widely held view that the reform movement will either collapse
in failure or prevail in a wave of democracy, this study suggests that
competing notions of authority will continue to define the ideological
terrain. Caught in a web of contradictions that they helped to spin,
Iran's
new democrats will have to accommodate -- and perhaps subordinate -- their
quest for freedom and tolerance to the demands of clerical
rule.
Table
of Contents
-
Introduction: In Search of the
"Real" Iran
-
Chapter One: Re-mapping Charisma
-
Chapter Two: Ascetic Mysticism and
the Roots of Khomeini's Charisma
-
Chapter Three: Absorbing the
Multiple Imaginations of the Islamic Left:
From Shariati to Khomeini
-
Chapter Four: The Rule of
the Jurist: Genesis of a Revolutionary Doctrine
-
Chapter Five: Dissonant
Institutionalization: The Imam in Power
-
Chapter Six: The Trials and
Tribulations of Complex Routinization
-
Chapter Seven: Children (and One
Father) of the Revolution
-
Chapter Eight: Disenchantment,
Charisma and...Reform?
-
Conclusion: Fear and
Joy
Introduction:
In Search of the "Real" Iran
That
many academics, journalists and policy makers were also surprised by
President Khatami's May 1997 electoral victory and by the ensuing struggle
over Khomeini's revolutionary legacy is understandable. After all, it was
difficult to square these events with either of the two dominant theories
of charismatic revolution. On one level, Khomeini may be the 20th
century's last example of a "pure" charismatic leader. His authority was
born of a profound and genuinely felt crisis of identity. Khomeini sought
to remedy this disenchantment through a revolutionary cris de coeur that
was hostile to all forms of economic activity and political organization.
When he reminded Iranians that the purpose of the revolution was not "to
have less expensive melons," he affirmed the irrational if understandable
aspiration for collective dignity that inspired the revolution.
Yet
if his charisma radiated a spiritual logic that could not be reduced to a
vulgar struggle for power or wealth, his quest to give his people a new
identity was also animated by a rational approach to politics and
religion. Khomeini articulated a utilitarian instrumentalism that viewed
religion as a provided a useful tool for attaining collective political
and social ends. Echoing the Third
World
ideologues of his day, he not only held that Islam was a "total ideology;"
but also insisted that this ideology could be represented by an elected
Majles that articulated the "interests" of the Iranian people. Which then,
was the real Khomeini? And more important, which was the real
Iran?
Was the Islamic revolution an irrational quest for utopia? Or was it about
creating institutions that could address the social and political
interests of Iranians?
This
book seeks to answer these difficult questions. Tracing the genesis and
transformation of what I call a system of contending authorities, it will
show how Khomeini's own efforts to accommodate competing visions of
political community set the stage for an ideological struggle over his
legacy in the nineties. Spurning all notions of linear development,
particularly those that posit a neat path from revolutionary charisma to
stable authority structures, I invite the reader to understand how a
system that strove to accommodate notions of rationality and
constitutional rule to the imperatives of charismatic rule and clerical
traditionalism, encouraged change while limiting its ideological and
political scope.
Beyond
telling this particular story, this book offers a broader lesson that
should interest social scientists seeking new insights into the dynamics
of ideological change in authoritarian systems. Bridging the gap between
the study of culture and political ideas on the one side, and historical
institutionalist analysis on the other, it offers a sobering reminder that
the images of authority that political actors bring to social and
political conflicts are not mere rationalizations of material interests
one side, or reflections of some cultural essence on the other. Viewed as
integral elements of a state and the ideological legacies it bequeaths,
these institutionalized images constitute decisive forces that can broaden
or quickly limit the space for political and ideological
change
Chapter
One: Remapping Charisma
The
notion that modern societies are beset by institutional and symbolic
contradictions is hardly new. From Karl Marx to Karl Deutsch, this theme
has informed nearly all of western social science. What is new is the
decidedly post-modern sensibility which some scholars have brought to this
subject. Eschewing all linear conceptions of social change, Friedland and
Alford argue that western political systems are constituted by multiple
and equally compelling "logics"...each of which... has an institutional
and symbolic foundation, and coexists in tension with the others...Since
each..."has places it cannot see, territory it cannot map," they invite us
to design new conceptual maps that highlight ..."contradictory
institutional systems." This book takes up that challenge, but with
respect to a land far different from the world that Friedland and Alford
have in mind.
Consider
the following by Ervan Abrahamian:
The
slippery label fundamentalism has been thrown at Khomeini so often that it
has stuck...Khomeinism, in contrast, is...concerned with sociopolitical
issues... [Populist movements] use charismatic figures and symbols...that
have potent value in the mass culture [to attack] the status
quo...[while]... stopping short of threatening the petty bourgeoisie
and... private property.
Abrahamian's
approach, which I refer to as "structural instrumentalism," does not deny
the importance of identity or culture or even irrational forces. But it
adheres to the cannon of instrumentalist analysis by arguing that cultural
symbols were used by elites, who constructed a charismatic ideology to
conceal the conflicting interests of a heterogenous ruling coalition...Now
consider, by contrast, this citation from Hamid Dabashi:
There
is the innate...human need for permanent re-enchantment...What would be
the direction of "creative effervescence" other than towards a
constant....upgrading of the most essential symbolics of religious
culture...The cult of Khomeini feeds on fertile Persian imagination beyond
the finality of the revolutionary sage.
Dabashi's
evaluation is informed by an approach that I call "symbolic utopianism."
According to this school, political communities, states or systems are
welded together by culturally resonant symbols or rituals that explain an
otherwise meaningless existence. When these symbols lose their appeal,
both masses and leaders break with the routines of everyday life by
plunging into transcendent rituals, symbols and experiences that express
society's communal vitality. These experiences may be reawakened or
personified by a charismatic leader, whose genuine belief in his divinity,
coupled with his struggle to reaffirm that divinity through bold acts and
utopian ideas, "re-enchants" the soul of society, thus paving the way for
a new legitimacy structure.
Such
dichotomous views of Iran's revolution-mass irrationality expressed
through culturally "authentic" transrational rituals, or elite use of
symbols for rational purposes-suggest how far we are from "mapping" the
kinds of contradictions about which Friedland and Alford have written...
As a result, our understanding of
Iran's
revolution suffers from two shortcomings. First, we do not sufficiently
appreciate its most enduring trait, which is the twin valorization of a
zealous quest for utopia alongside the pragmatic struggle for political
order. Second, as Michael Fischer has observed, we cannot fully grasp the
"dynamic instabilities" that have ensued from this wedding of what I call
"contending authorities."
The
following map of contending authorities connects the four conceptual
guideposts that I believe distinguish charismatic leaders and ideologies
in our postmodern age: (1) multiple biographies; (2) the layering of
multiple, imagined worlds; (3) dissonant institutionalization; (4) complex
routinization.
Chapter
Two: Ascetic Mysticism and the Roots of Khomeini's Charisma
This chapter
traces the cultural, political, social and psychological forces that gave
birth to Khomeini's charismatic authority. Highlighting his early exposure
to personal asceticism and Islamic mysticism, it argues that these two
traditions articulated Khomeini's profound disillusionment with everyday
existence after experiencing various injustices and indignities. The
resulting charismatic sensibility -his ceaseless desire to directly
experience what the Koran refers to as the "Light of the Heavens"-remained
with Khomeini throughout his life, illuminating a path that took him from
his career as a teacher to his position as Imam ...of the first and only
successful charismatic revolution the modern Islamic world has ever
experienced.
On
the face of it, this classic tale of charismatic leadership fully accords
with conventional accounts of Khomeini's biography in general, and his
personal charisma in particular. One way or another, these biographies
portray Khomeini as a revolutionary zealot...This thesis is amplified in
biographies published by both his allies and his detractors, in which
Khomeini is portrayed as a charismatic ideologue who from a young age was
determined to follow a revolutionary path. How do such messianic
portrayals fit into a study whose purpose is to portray the phenomenon of
multiple biographies?
The
answer is that these accounts... do capture one essential feature of
Khomeini's biography. However, they err by implicitly endorsing a basic
assumption of symbolic theory, namely that the irrational pull of pure
charisma cannot coexist with other forms of authority such as raison
d'état. The concept of multiple biographies argues that such accommodation
is not only possible but likely - particularly where the formative
experiences of youth imbue a leader with a powerful capacity for feeling
and expressing charisma. Thus "stamped," the charismatic impulse can
endure for a lifetime, pulling a leader in one direction as other ideals
push him along opposing paths. Even the most non-linear history of
charismatic leadership can have a point of inception, a point of
origination that bears scrutiny. To analyze this point we must identify
those forces which give birth to the charismatic impulse.
Chapter
Three: Absorbing the Multiple Imaginations of the Islamic Left: From
Shari'ati to Khomeini
Hannah
Arendt long ago held that the authority of charismatic revolutionaries
derives from the irrational way they make the world appear coherent:
"Totalitarian movements," she wrote, "conjure up a lying world of
consistency...in which...uprooted masses can feel at home and are spared
the never-ending shocks [of]... real life."...From his seat in
Qom's
Feyziyeh Seminary, Khomeini articulated this need for wholeness...This
chapter explores Khomeini's assimilation of a very different view of
authority. Subordinating the first principles of religion to the mundane
goal of creating and maintaining power, this pragmatic ethos envisioned
Islam as a useful tool for politically unifying Muslims. Placing Islam in
the service of the Muslim community's temporal needs, it suggested that
the "truths" of Islam were to be determined by changing social and
political interests, rather than by the timeless religious verities.
Following the conceptual framework set out in Chapter One,
my analysis of Khomeini's absorption of utilitarian Islamism transcends
instrumentalist and symbolic accounts of charisma. Symbolic theorists
acknowledge that the rationalization of religion sets the stage for the
emergence of pure charisma. But they would insist that this process
unfolds sequentially. Thus Dabashi argues that the instrumentalization of
Islam by intellectuals such as Jalal Al-e Ahmad and 'Ali Shari'ati
constituted a vital but distinct phase in a dialectic of alienation whose
ultimate realization could only be realized by a charismatic clerical
elite... In Dabashi's view, Shari'ati prophesied "a universal revolt of
the glorified masses" that Khomeini fulfilled "almost unknowingly."
Structural instrumentalists dismiss this sociology of unintended
consequences. Abrahamian argues that Khomeini and his clerical allies
appropriated the revolutionary ideology of the Islamic Left to rationalize
a pre-conceived economic project.
Both
accounts rest on the erroneous premise that the actions of charismatic
leaders are based on one dominant concept of authority. This chapter
suggests a different dynamic, one through which Khomeini and his allies
accommodated an instrumentalist ethos to the transrational logic of
charisma. To probe this dynamic, I highlight the secondary process through
which Khomeini absorbed the "multiple imaginations" of the Islamic Left.
This process was filled with paradoxes. Despite the nativist tone of their
rhetoric, Islamist Leftists championed an essentially Western political
vision. Moreover, although they did so in absolutist terms, they were au
fond the transmitters of a relativist notion of religion. Khomeini decried
such instrumentalism, insisting that Islam was not about economics. But he
could not help absorbing the core message of the Islamic Left, namely that
religious truths are made - and unmade- by people and for
people.
Chapter
Four: The Rule of the Jurist: Genesis of a Revolutionary
Doctrine
Having
explored Khomeini's assimilation of multiple images of authority, we must
now consider how this dynamic helped produce the very doctrine for which
he and his revolution stood: velayat-i faqih, or "Rule of the Jurist." We
shall see that while this doctrine was largely an ideological innovation,
its novelty derived not merely from the idea of one ruling faqih, but also
from its eclectic intellectual foundations. Drawing on traditional,
charismatic, and utilitarian themes, Khomeini created a vision of Islamic
rule was influenced by his own multiple biography. After spelling out this
argument, this chapter will review the social, cultural and political
conditions that set the stage for Khomeini's emergence as "Imam" in 1979.
My object here is to highlight the striking way in which the "Rule of the
Jurist" anticipated the Janus-faced nature of
Iran's
Islamic Revolution: a mass revolt that expressed a transrational quest for
collective renewal, and a socio-political struggle for economic
independence and social justice.
Chapter
Five: Dissonant Institutionalization: The Imam in Power
Because
the Islamic Left had helped to define the ideological terrain of the
revolution, and because the radical clergy had absorbed some of its ideas,
Khomeini and his allies could not completely eradicate -- nor dispense
with -- the political logic of the Islamic Left. Moreover, as we shall see
in the last section of this chapter, while the 1979 hostage crises may
have discredited the more liberal wing of the Islamic Freedom Movement, it
empowered a new generation of quasi-Marxist clerics and lay intellectuals
whose social and political projects echoed 'Ali Shari'ati's unique blend
of utopianism and rationalist instrumentalism.
This chapter explores this process of ideological
accommodation through the prism of "dissonant institutionalization," a
process by which contending visions of authority are embedded within a
diverse array of official and semi-official arenas... These domains
include, but are not limited to, competing ideological factions within the
state, formal constitutions or other written documents, and the everyday
political rhetoric of rulers. Although I address the issue of ideological
factionalization in the final section of this chapter, my focus will be on
analyzing the accommodation of contending visions of authority in two
arenas: the Islamic Republic' 1979 Constitution, and in Khomeini's daily
political discourse. As we shall see, the 1979 Constitution tried to
adjust Khomeini's charismatic theory of velayat-i faqih to the traditional
logic of clerical guidance and to the modern notion of popular
sovereignty. Similarly, an analysis of Khomeini's speeches and edicts will
show how the Imam zigzagged between a messianic notion of politics, and a
more utilitarian view which called for creating political institutions and
stable laws for defending the "interests"of the people.
In
analyzing these speeches...my more modest goal is to illustrate how a
genuinely charismatic leader can evince competing ideological commitments
in a remarkably open fashion...This chapter illustrates the dynamic of
dissonant institutionalization during the 1979-1982 period. These were the
years of Iran's
grande terreur, a time of revolutionary upheaval during which the regime
and its clerical vanguard gave full vent to their charismatic aspirations.
Their campaign revealed itself in the quest to mobilize the people and
their revolutionary committees against the domestic and foreign enemies,
and in the regime's efforts to compel all social groups to demonstrate
absolute obedience to the Imam. While incarnating this quest for
charismatic action and total loyalty, the Imam also evinced profound
ambiguity about the practical and philosophical costs of revolutionary
action. Pressed by contending allegiances, Khomeini demonstrated that the
road to heaven can be paved with multiple intentions.
Chapter
Six: The Trials and Tribulations of Complex Routinization
The
endeavor of Khomeini's disciples to enlist his support behind their
respective agendas pitted radical advocates of statist development against
conservative and pragmatic proponents of private enterprise. At times the
two sides compromised, only to see the Council of Guardians... veto their
reforms. This quintessential stand-off between traditional and
rational-legal authority could not be broken without amending the
Constitution in a manner that gave a clearer line of authority to one or
more ruling bodies. Yet the conflict Majles-council conflict also obscured
a more fundamental tension: that between the personal-charismatic
authority of Khomeini, and the institutional authority of the legislative
and judicial branches.
As
along as Khomeini's place in the regime was secure, this conflict was not
fatal. After all, Khomeini could always invoke his authority as rahbar
...to break the stalemate between the Majles and the Council of Guardians.
But in doing so he would invariably accentuate the political system's
dependence on a charismatic, yet mortal, leader. Assuming that no
successor could match Khomeini's exceptional stature, the constitutional
procedures for selecting the next faqih would have to be changed so that
his authority derived from his position or office, rather than his
personal qualities. As a result, political and economic routinization were
inextricably linked. Without tackling the first, little progress could be
made on the second.
Khomeini's response to this double challenge illustrates
the contradictory dynamics of complex routinization. On the one hand, his
mystical-charismatic vision of social justice hindered his ability to
articulate a clear social project and also frustrated his disciples's
efforts to gain the Imam's support for their respective economic agendas.
On the other hand, Khomeini's long-held desire to strengthen the ruling
institutions of the state encouraged him to seek concrete solutions to the
problems of social and political authority. As a result, a beguiling cycle
emerged. Instead of intervening, Khomeini would encourage the Majles,
Government and Council of Guardians to resolve their differences. When
such cooperation failed to emerge, he would support one faction. But such
intervention simply highlighted the dependence of the political system on
Khomeini's personal charisma, thus hindering Khomeini's own efforts to
institutionalize power. The frustrated Imam would then seek refuge in a
mystical vision that was as alluring as it was ineffective.
This
pattern emerged in full bloom during the Iran-Iraq war. Since Khomeini
believed that the war provided a vital outlet through which
Iran's
young martyrs experienced mystical transcendence, he was loath to give it
up. Finally, prompted by Majles Speaker 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and
facing economic crisis, Khomeini issued his 1
January 1988
edict on the interests of the state. Eight months later he accepted a
cease-fire and then backed Rafsanjani's campaign for constitutional
reform. The new Constitution, promulgated within days of Khomeini's death
in June 1989, not only diminished the charismatic authority of the faqih
by separating the positions of marja' (or "highest religious source of
imitation") and faqih; but, by still providing for the direct, popular
election of the president, and the indirect selection of the faqih by a
clerical assembly, it also created the potential for serious rivalry
between the president and Supreme Leader.
The
implications of this failure to coherently routinize authority were at
first unclear. The principal concern of Khomeini's disciples was to show
that supporting -- or opposing -- the above constitutional reforms was
consistent with Khomeini's wishes. Thus the second facet of routinization,
the struggle to reappropriate a leader's ideological legacy, began within
days of Khomeini's death. Rafsanjani and his allies realized the above
reforms by manipulating the utilitarian aspects of Khomeini's speeches and
edicts. Yet Rafsanjani's actions, as those of his rivals, signaled only
the opening he skirmish in a prolonged ideological war. Chapters Seven and
Eight highlight the conflicting twists and turns that this contest took
during the nineties.
Chapter
Seven: Children (and One Father) of the Revolution
And
so it came to pass that twelve years after the Islamic Revolution, after
the many sacrifices and hardships suffered by Iran's youth, Majles Deputy
Zadsar reached the staggering conclusion that the "most fateful historic
event is establishing the uniform foreign exchange rate." Zadsar made this
claim some months after President Rafsanjani and Supreme Leader Khamane'i
had purged the Majles of many radicals. Determined to silence critics of a
controversial economic reform program, Rafsanjani stood by as conservative
clerics accused former Minister of Heavy Industries Behzad Nabavi and
other radicals of undermining the revolution's Islamic principles.
Stunned, Nabavi sent Rafsanjani an open letter in which he recounted his
stalwart efforts to defend these values and warned that the "children of
the...revolution" were being purged by the very state that they helped to
create.
This chapter traces this second stage in the battle over
Khomeini's's legacy and evaluates how it helped reshape the ideological
contours of post-Khomeini
Iran.
While highlighting what Ashraf has called the "disintegrative" potential
of Khomeini's charisma, I will endeavor to demonstrate that the process by
which the Imam's legacy fragmented into its constituent parts was not
wholly random. Indeed, if the 1991-92 purges encouraged some children of
the revolution, and one father, to advance a more democratic -- even
liberal -- interpretation of Khomeini's legacy, this development owed much
to a utilitarian and populist logic that was a central to the Imam's
dissonant ideological vision.
I
begin by analyzing the rhetorical contours of Rafsanjani's
traditionalization strategy. Two factors... pushed the president to adopt
this strategy. First...the new Constitution did not coherently routinize
authority. While it weakened the faqih's... charismatic authority by
separating the posts of marja' and faqih, it strengthened the latter's
traditional powers. This situation caused a dilemma: although Rafsanjani's
direct election gave him a popular base.. any attempt to enhance his
democratic credentials might be seen as an effort to diminish Khamane'i's
authority. As a result, this constitutionally blessed arrangement created
an institutional incentive for cooperation between the president and the
faqih. Second, the dissonant institutionalization of conservative and
radical factions in the Majles pushed Rafsanjani to back the
conservatives. Because the new faqih was merely "one among equals" and
lacked personal charisma to contain this conflict, the radicals felt free
to assail Rafsanjani's economic reforms with abandon. These attacks
antagonized conservative deputies, many of whom favored the president's
reforms... Thus the president responded not by promoting greater openness,
but by insisting that Khomeini's legacy required absolute loyalty to the
faqih.
The
radicals answered this traditionalization strategy in two ways: first,
they engaged in what might be called "recharismatization." Casting the
Imam as a quasi-divine figure, they held that the government's social,
political and economic policies should be based solely on Khomeini's
edicts, speeches, and "Last Will and Testament." Second, they invoked the
Majles' constitutionally decreed authority to evaluate and criticize the
action's of the executive. They held that neither Rafsanjani nor the faqih
could make policy without considering the view of the Majles. These two
strategies backfired by encouraging the faqih and the President to embrace
each other all the more.
The
subsequent purge of radical Majles deputies in the months leading up the
May 1992 elections provoked a storm of protest. Suddenly, a language that
had rarely been heard on the floor of the Majles now made itself heard:
the language of individual rights, personal freedoms, and ideological
pluralism. Although riddled with ambiguities and inconsistencies that
mirrored its self-serving function...the fact that this hobbled vision of
political and ideological pluralism was legitimated by invoking the Imam's
legacy suggests that by 1992 the Islamic Republic was already moving in
new directions.
Chapter
Eight: Disenchantment, Charisma and...Reform?
In
the struggle over Khomeini's legacy, every competing faction claimed the
Imam for itself. If conservative Majles deputy Parvaresh could justifiably
accuse the radicals of "trying to portray the Imam as solely your own,"
his allies on the Right also strove to monopolize Khomeini's memory. Few
obeyed the Imam's final instruction, namely, that "whatever statement is,
or will be, attributed to me is not acceptable unless I have said it in my
own voice...or has my signature." But while the battle over Khomeini's
legacy continued into the midnineties, its political significance changed.
Henceforth, that contest served as a surrogate for a fundamental debate
over the very nature of authority. Following the 1991-1992 purges... and
,,,campaign against "cultural onslaught," several lay thinkers and clerics
began asking whether a political system based on contending notions of
authority could long endure. Convinced, as Abdolkarim Soroush put it, that
"all of the problems comes from the effort to combine" conflicting
principles, these thinkers implied that the very survival of the Islamic
Republic required pruning Khomeini's legacy of its more glaring
ideological contradictions.
Yet
what did this mean? Which values were in conflict and which were in sync?
Which could be accommodated and which deserved discarding? And could a
system based on the dissonant institutionalization of contending visions
of authority be prodded in a more coherent direction without undermining
its very ideological foundations? The answer to this last question was not
merely theoretical: the effort to routinize Khomeini's authority could
easily provoke a counterattack from conservative clerics. As with all
hard-liners, they saw any reform as invitation to their demise. The
challenge facing the reformers, then, was to show that the opposite was
true, namely that without reform, the entire system might collapse under
the weight of popular discontent
By
the midnineties the growing spiritual and symbolic disenchantment of the
postrevolution generation seemed to be pushing
Iran
in this very direction. Alienated as much by the state's dogma as by its
intolerance of just plain fun, many youths either became apathetic, or
they committed an even more shocking act: they turned to Western culture
for inspiration! The clerics responded by intensifying their campaign
against the "cultural onslaught." But such efforts only created greater
disaffection. At this point the reformists stepped in. Seizing the
initiative, they tried to lift the young out of their existential doldrums
by recasting Khomeini's charismatic legacy in a more democratic and
pluralistic light. For a second time
Iran's
history, disenchantment gave way to charisma.
Conservative
clerics inadvertently sparked this cycle. Having prevailed in the Majles,
they launched a campaign to purge other state institutions of potential
reformists. In late 1992 Minister of Islamic Guidance Sayyid Mohammad
Khatami was forced to resign for failing to correctly "guide" the youth.
Next to go was Mohammad Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Director of the Voice and
Vision Broadcasting Company. By1994, hundreds of intellectuals and
supposed dissidents were in prison, and some had been executed. Yet his
campaign only encouraged a new wave of reformist thinking. Among these
intellectuals was Mohammad Khatami. A member of the clerical left, after
his forced resignation from the Islamic Guidance Ministry he answered his
critics by arguing that only way to address the challenge of Western
culture was to create a tolerant vision of Islamic civilization.
Abdolkarim Soroush, a lay intellectual, endorsed this thesis but went
further: he argued that the creation of a rational and open Islam required
distancing clerics from political power.
The
hardliners held that this bid to sort out Khomeini's legacy was in fact an
exhibition of disloyalty to it. Citing Khomeini's own words, Ayatollah
Mahdavi-Kani and his allies reduced this legacy to one simple formula:
fanatical opposition to West "civilization" and the repression of all
"liberals" who dared question the ultimate authority of the faqih... Thus
the conservatives scorned the reformists' argument that the faqih's role
as "guide" of the overall system should be accommodated to the rule of law
and the authority of the Majles. While Khatami and his allies argued that
this defining the faqih's authority in such transpolitical terms would
enhance his stature, the conservatives feared that this was a recipe for
the Islamic state's self-destruction.
Why,
given the conservatives' fierce opposition to the reformists, did Khatami
prevail in the May 1997 elections? His success was partly due to his
rhetorical skills: by trying to show that his revisionist agenda was
consonant with Khomeini's "greatest legacy...the establishment of Islamic
government," Khatami diluted -- although by no means prevented --
opposition from Supreme Leader 'Ali Khamane'i. But Khatami's victory was
also stemmed from the overwhelming popularity of his message. By
addressing the burning desire of Iran's youth for a pluralistic,
democratic and spiritually uplifting vision of the future, he galvanized
the country...This said, it would be premature to conclude that Khatami's
election victory made a transition...to pluralist democracy inevitable.
Given the enduring institutional authority of the faqih, as well as the
conservatives' capacity to mobilize supporters of the "old system,"
Khatami may well conclude that his political fate rests in accommodating
rather than in opposing the system of contending authorities.
Conclusion:
Fear and Joy
On
the twentieth anniversary of Iran's
Islamic Revolution, Tehran's
Revolution Square hosted Mickey Mouse and Bugs Bunny. Apparently, the
young people who flocked to this event were not bothered by the spectacle
of American cartoon characters celebrating the fall of the Shah. The same,
however, could not be said of Supreme Leader 'Ali Khamane'i. As far as the
he was concerned, the 5000 young people who joined this "Carnival of Joy"
were suffering from a bad case of false consciousness. After all, he
insisted several days after the event, "The young people of today
can...never be fooled by the tricks and smiles of
America
and Zionism."
Yet
while it is easy to lampoon Khamane'i's fear of joy, we would be mistaken
to assume that the austere asceticism and anti-Americanism that he
articulated had lost its foothold in the ideologies, institutions and
ruling elite. Mohammad Khatami's experiences during the two years
following his election demonstrated that he faced a tricky dilemma. On the
one hand, his overwhelming victory at the polls encouraged his followers
to push for an immediate opening of the political and cultural field. On
the other hand, his conservative detractors seized every occasion to
undermine Khatami and his allies in government, the media, and the
universities. Khatami's dilemma was to respect such forces without
alienating his supporters would prove a delicate task.
Khatami
skillfully negotiated their countervailing pressures. In doing so, he has
secured an unprecedented measure of glasnost in the cultural and
intellectual fields... However, the assumption held by many
"transitionologists"-- namely, that such experiments in political
liberalization are inherently unstable, and thus either set the stage for
a break through to competitive democracy, or provoke a counterreform from
"hard-liners"-- may be wrong. Rather than move forward or back along a
linear path, the system of contending authorities forged by Khomeini and
re-tooled by... Rafsanjani and Khamane'i may endure in new institutional
and ideological forms. This appear's to be Khatami's objective...While the
February 2000 parliamentary elections, during which reformists crushed
their conservative rivals, suggest that the reformists had stretched the
Imam's words about as far as they would go, I will argue in the
"theoretical reprise" that concludes this chapter that domestic and global
realities may very well facilitate Khatami's efforts to reform, rather
than eclipse, the system of contending authorities that he inherited in
May 1997.
