Abdolkarim Soroush
(b.1945) is an Iranian philosopher-thinker whose innovative ideas on
religious reform are sure to win him a place among the most prominent
Muslim reformers of this century. A graduate of Tehran
University in pharmacology, Soroush
undertook postgraduate studies in history and the philosophy of science at
the University of
London in the early 1970s. His
searching mind, already familiar with Islamic and Western classical
philosophical traditions, was captivated by modern philosophy. Significant
breakthroughs occurred in his intellectual development, some becoming
foundational components of his thought.
Prior to
postgraduate work, Soroush was long preoccupied with textual
interpretation - a product of his extensive, systematic study of Qur'anic
exegesis, and classical theological, mystical and philosophical works such
as Rumi and Al-Ghazali. These joined with new insights to draw him into a
vortex of intellectual activity aimed at re-evaluating traditional
metaphysics in order to find a convincing solution to the relationship
between science and metaphysics/reason and revelation. Context has also
contributed to Soroush's intellectual fruition as a Muslim reformer. In
the 1960s, as a religiously committed and socio-politically concerned
student, he pondered revivalist literature from Al-Afghani to Ali
Sharicati. Since returning to Iran shortly after the 1979
revolution, he has experienced the rule of an Islamic government, the
supremacy of an ideologized Islam, and the implementation of a
jurisprudential understanding of Islam.
Contraction
and expansion of religious knowledge
His turbulent yet
rewarding intellectual journey culminated in the development of his
epistemological/hermeneutical 'Theory of Contraction and Expansion of
Religious Knowledge'. This theory, constituting the foundation stone of
Soroush's reform plan, distinguishes him from other revivalists.
Notwithstanding his deep appreciation of their endeavours, Soroush
believes that his theory provides a hitherto absent but vital
contribution, that is, an epistemological structure. To reconcile the
immutable (religion) with change (dynamic world) it is necessary to
distinguish between religion and religious knowledge. Religion is divine,
eternal, immutable and sacred, while human understanding of it is in
constant exchange with every field of human knowledge. As such, religious
knowledge is in flux, relative, and time-bound. This recognition means
that issues of reform can be addressed without compromising the sacredness
of religion. Revivalists' neglect of this foundation has diverted their
attention from fundamental questions. Consequently, solutions, though
valuable, have been provisional. Nevertheless, Soroush claims neither
perfection nor finality for his approach.
Soroush's goal goes beyond
unsystematic reforms in certain selected, mostly legal, matters and his
plan is multidimensional. Of its two major aspects, one is to prune
elements and understandings that are considered superfluous and stagnant
and have often obscured the essence of religion. The other is to equip
religion with extra-religious means and values, chiefly in reconciling
reason and revelation.
Ideology
and fiqh, reason and
revelation
His pathology of
contemporary Islam surfaces numerous ills. Although post-revolutionary
conditions in Iran are central to his diagnosis, Soroush has no difficulty
identifying these problems all over the Muslim world. First, he sees the
ideologizing of Islam, the prevalent mode of Islamic resurgence since the
1960s, as detrimental to the essence of religion. Among other things, it
makes religion an instrument for attaining goals. It promotes a dogmatic
understanding of religion concerned with exoteric, accidental aspects,
ignoring deeper meanings and resulting in intellectual rigidity and
exclusivism. It fixes one understanding of religion as final, absolute,
official, and beyond criticism. Demanding its official interpreters, it
entrusts the clergy with a priori privileges and gives access to religious
totalitarianism at societal and political levels. Soroush calls this the
'Islam of identity'. At best, it is an ideological means that may help
Muslims overcome their modernity-inspired 'crisis of identity'; whereas
the 'Islam of truth', understood as the essential truths to which prophets
have invited humankind, is only remotely related to this 'expediental'
Islam.
A second problem is the undue emphasis given to legal aspects
of Islam (shari'ah and
fiqh) at the cost of
ethics and theology. Soroush's critique of this imbalance targets
traditionalists and some modernists alike, the former for reducing Islam
to fiqh. The latter,
trapped in this short-sightedness, have lost their ability to recognize
ills at a deeper level and have thus reduced reform to partial and
unsystematic legal solutions. Soroush does not underestimate the
significance of fiqh and
shari'ah. What he argues
against is ascribing to it primacy, comprehensiveness and finality.
Inspired by his 'mentor' Al-Ghazali, he believes that fiqh is neither the core of
Islam nor its totality and should thus be confined to its own sphere.
Moreover, a fiqh-based
understanding of Islam puts a premium on 'amal (outward practices)
rather than iman (inner
faith). It envisions a society wherein the enforcement of the shari'ah,
ritualism and uniformity in religious experience prevail. This absence of
plurality leads to hypocrisy and monopoly on truth.
These two ills have
not only caused a stagnation in religious thought, they have promoted a
'maximalist' view of religion. They have prevented a dialogue among
Islamic religious sciences and between Islam and the human sciences,
necessary components to a revitalization of Islamic thought. Only through
such recognition and willingness to enter into a give-and-take process
will Islamic thought break the shackles of rigidity and absolutism. This
is a summons to the invigorating role of reason, a call deeply aligned
with Mu'tazilite rationalism and resonating with the pleas of Muhammad
Abduh and Muhammad Iqbal.
A 'maximalist' view of religion affirms that
what Muslims need to solve their problems or administer their public and
personal lives is all provided in Islam as if religion were a repository
of pre-packaged solutions for all problems at all times. This deprives
Muslims of the intellectual challenge and benefit of other means and
values. In practice, it recedes to fiqh, which, in its most lively
manifestation, ijtihad,
is ironically the most in need of extra-religious knowledge. A
'maximalist' view of religion is perhaps best exemplified in the
prevailing discourse on Islam and politics. It teaches that shari'ah is an
all-comprehensive system of law that provides for political needs. This
juridical approach to politics not only disregards the very nature of the
matter, it ends in some un-resolvable contradictions.
Islam
and democracy
Soroush argues that
discussion about Islam and politics should be approached from outside of
religion. Reconciling religion and democracy is of the same nature as
reconciling reason and revelation; both involve extra-religious values and
means. In essence, the nature of the state and values and methods of
governance are not matters of religious jurisprudence but belong to
political philosophy. With regard to religion, they should be addressed in
kalam (theology). Human
beings qua human beings are entitled to a priori rights, including
political ones. Pivotal values of democracy - justice and freedom - are
extra-religious, though upheld by religious systems. Methods of governance
are also non-religious. Administering public life is a rational matter
that should benefit from modern social sciences, economics and
administration. Fiqh is
neither a science of administration nor a government platform. Anything
found in religion in this respect is 'minimal' and 'accidental'; it is not
'essential' to religion. Arguing for the possibility of a religious
democratic state, Soroush believes that if democracy is irreconcilable
with the normative legal reading of Islam, it can be compatible with
another understanding that accords primacy to human values such as
rationality, justice, freedom and human rights. Therefore, democracy can
work in a religious society only if the respective theoretical foundations
are harmonized.
Islam
and modernity
Acutely aware of an
epistemological break between the old and modern worlds, Soroush believes
that any serious attempt at Islamic modernism should begin by equipping
itself with modern concepts, perceptual outlooks and intellectual means.
Of the several issues addressed by Soroush, two are modern: critical
reason vs. traditional hermeneutical reason, and rights vs.
duties.
Modern Muslim thought needs to adopt critical reasoning, a tool
that not only involves a critical historical approach to traditional
religious paradigms but can also suggest alternatives. One of the most
decisive paradigmatic changes of the modern world is that most of its
concepts and institutions are right-based, reflecting the shift in human
self-perception from duty-bearing to right-bearing. Equally critical of
the shortcomings of the past duty-oriented mentality and the current
right-oriented mentality, Soroush proposes a third paradigm in which
elements of rationality and rights are tempered by a form of religiosity
that prevents human beings from assuming God-like characteristics and
obliges them to God. However, the nature and definition of this
religiosity and obligation differ radically from conventional notions that
are primarily geared to external behaviour.
Far from inviting
secularism, Soroush advances a learned and examined kind of religiosity.
This dimension of his project deals, one might say, with reviving a higher
mystical type of religiosity. It is an 'experiential religiosity' based on
the love of God, the prototype of which is the 'prophetic experience' of
Muhammad. What the demystified modern world is in need of is an
'experiential' not 'expediental' religiosity where God is experienced as a
gracious Beloved, not as a stern Law-giver. His commands are observed not
out of obligation to legal duties but out of compulsion of
love.
Soroush's reform plan targets the shortcomings of both tradition
and modernity. While advocating adoption of certain modern elements to
strengthen the tradition, it searches the deep layers of tradition to
offer a remedy for the spiritual impoverishment of the modern age. In
order to become functional in the modern world, religion needs to interact
meaningfully with modern concepts, outlooks and institutions. To this end,
Soroush moves reform from the plane of fiqh to deeper levels of
theology and philosophy where essential concepts of God, humankind and
religiosity are to be redefined. This is predicated on the recognition of
the need for a dialogical pluralism between inside and outside of
religious intellectual fields. The complementarity of Soroush's project
lies in the fact that it invigorates the intellectual rational tradition
of Islam and at the same time accentuates its spiritual richness. The
effect is to restrain the arrogance and self-centredness of modern
humankind.
Bibliography
Soroush, Abdolkarim (2000),
Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam, translation by Mahmood Sadri and
Ahmad
Sadri,
Oxford.
Soroush, Abdolkarim (1998), 'The Evolution and Devolution of
Religious Knowledge', in Kurzman, Charles (ed.) Liberal Islam,
Oxford.
Jahanbakhsh, Forough
(2001),
Islam, Democracy and Religious Modernism in Iran: From Bazargan to Soroush, Leiden:
Brill.
Vakili, Valla (2001), 'Abdolkarim Soroush and Critical Discourse
in Iran', in Esposito, John, and Voll, John (eds.), The Makers of
Contemporary Islam, Oxford.
Those
technical terms in quotation (e.g. 'maximalist', 'experiential
religiosity', etc.) are taken from Soroush's own works hitherto in
Persian. For the sake of space limitation no individual
reference is given
here.
Forough
Jahanbakhsh, Ph.D. in Islamic Studies from McGill University, is assistant
professor in Islamic Studies at Queen's University,
Canada.
E-mail:
jahanbak@post.queensu.ca