1. Introduction
2. The Student Movement during the Pahlavi
Period
3. The Student Movement during Khomeini's Rule
3.1. Prior to
the Cultural Revolution
.....3.2. The Student Movement and the
Cultural Revolution
.....3.3. Student Organizations as the Arm of the
State
.....3.4. The Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat [The DTV]
.....3.5.
The Tabarzadi Group or the EEADD
.....3.6. Student Apathy and
Alienation
4. The Student Movement during Rafsanjani's Presidency
5. The Student Movement during Khatami's Presidency
.....5.1.
Structural Changes in the
Iranian
Universities and Society
.....5.2. Rebirth of Student Activism and the Conservative Reaction
6. The July Protests
.....6.1. Politics of Protest in Universities
.....6.2. Developments Leading to the Attack
.....6.3. The Attack
on the Student Dormitory
.....6.4. The Crackdown: Cutting the Losses
and Going on an Offensive
.....6.5. The Blame Game, Continued Arrests,
and Closed Door Trials
.....6.6. Organization and Demands of
Protesters
7. Where to from Here?
8. Endnotes
1. Introduction
Writing about current affairs is a risky adventure. One may not
be sure whether his/her finger is truly on the pulse of events or only on
a flutter resulting from turbulent storms in distant waters. Though many
of the facts about the July student protests in Iranian universities is
still to be sorted out, there are missing pieces in the puzzle whose
future discovery will help us develop a better and more accurate picture
of what happened in those crucial six days. The more one reads about the
July events in
Iran, the
more it becomes clear that much of what is being written is filled with
either wishful thinking or calculated reporting. Much of what has been
published in
Iran
during the past three months is either calculated reporting by different
political factions or self-censored reporting by a press in constant fear
of attack by the conservative courts and vigilantes, known as the Ansar-e
Hezbollah [hereafter the Ansar]. The official reports of this event can
best be described as topsy-turvy. They represent an intentional inversion
of facts in order to hide clues as to the real perpetrators of the raid on
student dormitories and subsequent events. They are engineered in order to
withhold damaging information, generate a sense of stability, blame the
trouble on the targeted enemies, and cover up wrong doings by security
forces and groups associated with both government factions.
Outside of
Iran,
reports and analyses of these events, by both Iranians and non-Iranians,
are free of censorship but are filled with premature conclusions and
romanticization of the student movement in
Iran. A
respected foreign magazine went so far as to characterize these events as
another revolution. (1) Patrick Clawson of the Washington Institute for
Near Eastern Policy spoke of "the beginning of the end" of the Islamic
Republic and Hammed Shahidian, an Iranian activist scholar in the United
States, wrote an article in Persian, titled "The beginning of the End."
(2) The wide and sudden burst of these accounts may explain the desires
for a serious change in
Iran among
Iranians living abroad. However, it fails to explain why we have heard
nothing about the Iranian student movement for the past two decades of the
Islamic Republic's rule. In fact, several experts have spoken of the
silent and difficult period of Iranian student movement during the past
two decades. (3) The issue became so serious that on the anniversary of
the occupation of the American Embassy, in 1994, Ayatollah Seyed Ali
Khamenei warned of indifference among students. Later, the official
student magazine associated with his representative at
Amir
Kabir
Technical
University warned that this
condition would negatively affect the revolution. (4)
Aside from the optimistic and sympathetic features of these
accounts, they characterize the student movement in
Iran as an
organized, independent, democratic, and secular movement bent on replacing
the Islamic government with a democratic one. Many of the writings about
the student movement in
Iran are
based on a romantic view of student activism and a desire to overthrow the
Islamic Republic. The current student movement in
Iran is
quite different from the movement that developed during the Pahlavi
regime.
The revolution and subsequent developments have had qualitative
effects on the organization, leadership, ideology, and direction of this
movement. The current student movement is significantly more complex and
demanding than ever before. It is increasingly connected to the political
demands of the Iranian civil society, as well as the factional politics
and structural crises of the IRI. In the following paragraphs, I will
briefly review the student movement during the Pahlavi Period, and then
move on to discuss in more detail the ebb and flow of student activism
which led to the July protests. The purpose is to show the characteristics
of the student movement in each period, demonstrate the nature of energy
channeled into the July protests, and show both the engineered and
spontaneous phases of these events.
2. The Student Movement during the Pahlavi
Period
Up until the revolution, the student movement was one of the
most active elements of the suppressed Iranian civil society. The
University of
Tehran was established in 1934
but it is not until the departure of Reza Shah from
Iran in
1944 that we can speak of a student movement in
Iran. The
most visible and eventful aspects of this movement can be found in its
activities during the three decades of Mohammad Reza Shah's rule. These
activities began early during the struggle for the nationalization of the
oil industry and events that resulted in the overthrow of Mossadeq's
government and the return of the Shah. In the absence of political parties
in much of this period, the movement became the political spokesman for
ideological and political trends in society and a vanguard of
socio-political protest in
Iran. (5)
It was the most outspoken force against the state. It also had a diverse
ideological character reflecting the ideologies of political opposition.
In fact, it was a movement closely tied to political opposition and
ideological movements outside of the campuses.
Despite its ideological diversity, organizationally speaking
the movement consisted of two groups: Islamic and non-Islamic. The secular
or non-Islamic associations, which were the strongest and largest
associations, often had ties to the guerrilla movement operating outside
of universities and served as a recruiting ground for them.(6) That is why
all members of the guerrilla movement were university students.(7) The
Islamic associations made up a small segment of the student movement and
often had loose contacts with Ayatollah Khomeini and the Nehzat-e
Azaadi-ye Iran [The Freedom Movement of Iran, hereafter NAI]. Both sets of
associations worked with each other against the Pahlavi dictatorship.
Given the prevalence of political suppression and the common opposition to
the Shah, there were few clashes between these associations. At most,
disagreements between them would result in non-cooperation in
mobilization.
Though Iranian students always identified with Third World independence movements, especially Palestinian and
Vietnamese causes, their focus remained on
Iran.
Rarely did these associations advocate reformist goals. If there were any
reformist attitude, it was found mostly during the premierships of
Mohammad Mossadeq and later Ali Amini. The slogan "reforms yes,
dictatorship no", advocated by the Jebhe Melli
Iran [the
Iran National Front hereafter JMI] in early 1962, had some following among
its student branches. The dominant features of the movement during the
Pahlavi period were political radicalism, intellectual idealism,
anti-dictatorship, anti-imperialism, anti-Americanism, and nationalism.
When concerning themselves with educational issues affecting the daily
aspects of teaching and learning in universities, the matter would
invariably become political and turn into a concern against the state. In
short, the focus of the movement was political; the scope of its
activities national, and the state was always the target.
In the last years of the Pahlavi regime, it was students who
again initiated the process that later culminated in revolution. Student
poetry readings, which began in
Tehran, were an early catalyst
in a chain of events that crippled the old regime. In 1977, when
demonstrations against the Shah had become widespread, the student
associations recruited many new members and organized numerous protest
rallies in major cities.(8) The Islamic associations also became extremely
active, collaborating more closely with forces supporting Ayatollah
Khomeini's call for the departure of the Shah.
3. The Student Movement during
Khomeini's Rule
3.1. Prior to the Cultural Revolution: During early
days of the revolution, students expanded their activities, joined
revolutionary forces, and engaged in the takeover and occupation of
numerous residential properties left behind by the fleeing high members of
the old regime.(9) Political ideologies of general movements outside of
the university began to have a great impact on the student associations
and their activities. By the time the Shah left the country and Ayatollah
Khomeini returned, the student associations had become a major arm of
their respective political groups in universities. As recruitment ground,
these student associations had turned universities into de facto
headquarters for their respective political groups and battlegrounds for
much of their ideological scuffles. Many faculty members followed students
in organizing for collective action, such as the Sazemaan-e Melli
Daaneshgaahi-yaane
Iran (the
National Organization for University Professors = NOUP). (10) During early
days of the revolution when the clerical establishment had begun purging
universities and appointing loyal staffs to university positions, the NOUP
issued a statement calling for the democratic management and student
participation in the university affairs. (11) In the chaotic days of the
revolution, when the new regime was struggling to gain control of
situations, these demands added to problems of managing universities, the
government, and the society. Faced with the tasks of institution and state
building, Mehdi Bazargan's Provisional Government was disturbed by the
constant political agitations and demands put to it by political groups,
including student and faculty organizations. Working with the clerics, the
Islamic Student Organizations also agitated against the so-called liberal
policies followed by the Provisional Government.
On November 4, 1979, following an earlier attempt by the
Sazmaane Fedaa' iyaan-e Iran [the Organization of Devotees, a Marxist
organization] in February 1979, a group of Muslim students calling
themselves "Daaneshjooyaane Mosalmaane Payro Khat-e Emaam" [the Muslim
Students Following the Imam's Path, hereafter MSFIL] took initiative and
engaged in the boldest, most radical, and most consequential action by any
student group in the history of student activism in Iran: the seizure of
the US Embassy and the holding of American diplomats as hostages for 444
days.
Ayatollah Khomeini supported the takeover and the MSFIL's
cause, thus using the Embassy takeover for undermining various elements of
opposition to his newly established theocracy. The first victim was the
Provisional Government, which fell apart two days after the takeover. Soon
after, the MSFIL began to piece together and release shredded documents
from the US Embassy, charging various individuals and groups with
collaboration with the American government. Tough most targets were
anti-clerical groups or secular intelligentsia, religious opposition, then
led by Grand Ayatollah Shariatmadari, was not spared.(12) The clerical
establishment efficiently used these students and the hostages for
subjugating dissent and consolidating their power. However, they could
neither allow this level of radicalism to spread to other social arenas
nor to continue for long. Later resolution of the hostage crisis and the
engagement in a war with
Iraq
required more control over various forms of activism outside of the
government institutions.(13)
3.2. The Student Movement and the Cultural
Revolution: After the election of Abolhassan Banisadr as the first
president of the IR, universities continued to be a hotbed of activism.
Being young, active, energetic, and mostly influenced by the secular
groups, especially the leftist organizations, students, as well as their
Western educated teachers, were a major obstacle in the way of
consolidation of power by the clerics. Being able to establish an Islamic
government, clerics felt the need to neutralize the influence of secular
currents and their respective student supporters in
universities.
On February 27, 1980, the Ministry of Interior issued an order banning
"activities of all political groups in universities" and demanding that
"cultural activities by students" must conform to the government and
university regulations. On March
21,1980, Ayatollah Khomeini criticized universities for giving
refuge to professors and students "who were dependent on the East and
West, and opposed the Islamization of universities." A week after his
speech, the Technical University of Tehran was forced to close by the
Islamic Student Association in that university. On April 18,
1980, after a Friday Prayer
speech against universities by then Hojatoleslam Khamenei, Hezbollahi
elements, shouting slogans against "the West- and East-stricken
professors," rallied toward three universities: the Polytechnic, Science
and Technology, and Teacher Training. The Revolutionary Council issued a
warning to students and political groups asking them to close their
offices in universities within three days. On April 19,
1980, several universities were taken
over by the Islamic Student Associations. Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani ordered
the Pasdaaraan [the Guardians Corps] and Forces of Revolutionary
Committees to enter universities. Fights broke out among Hezbollahi
elements and students and many students were injured. On April 21,
Ayatollah Khomeini demanded the "leftist" groups to stop "opposing the
Islamic purge [Paaksaazi-ye Eslaami]," otherwise he would utter "the last
word." Resisting occupation and closedown of universities, hundreds of
students were injured and several were killed in clashes. On April 22,
supporting attacks on student groups, President Abolhassan Banisadr
declared "the birth of Government Sovereignty" [velaadate haakemiyate
dolat] and termed these developments "a Cultural Revolution." On April 24,
protesting the mounting death and injuries in universities, the Managing
Council of Tehran University
resigned. Four days later, the Revolutionary Council ordered universities
to close starting on June 5, 1980.
Students resisted both the order and attacks on universities.
For more than two weeks, there were bloody clashes among Hezbollahi
elements and students of different political persuasions. Islamic
associations were used to identify, report, attack, and help arrest
non-Islamic students and sabotage their organized political and cultural
activities.(14) This was the first time in the history of the Iranian
student movement that a part of the movement was used against itself. On
May 12, 1980, an
entity at the time called the Edaareh-ye Tahkim va Vahdat-e Anjoman-haaye
Eslaami [The Office of Consolidation and Unity of Islamic Associations]
announced that their attacks on universities were in line with the orders
from Imam Khomeini. On June 5, all universities were shut down. Two days
later, Ayatollah Khomeini argued that universities should not open until
they were purged of un-Islamic elements and grounds were laid for an
Islamic education. (15) On June 12, Ayatollah Khomeini established the
Shoraaye Enqelaabe Farhangi [The Council for Cultural Revolution,
hereafter CCR] for preparing for the Islamization of
universities.
Universities remained closed for over two years. During this
period, the CCR engaged in a review of all programs in universities.
Committees, including Islamic students, were established to review faculty
and students' activities and beliefs. Many activist students and faculty
members were fired and/or arrested for their affiliations with political
groups. This was the end of the independent student movement in
Iran. In
1983, some members of the ruling clerics believed that "politics is for
the clergy and students should be followers." (16) Ayatollah Khomeini
opposed this view and maintained that students should remain politically
active, but within an Islamic framework and at the service of the
revolution.
3. 3. Student Organizations as the Arm of
the State: When universities re-opened in 1982, they were purged of
leftist, nationalist, secular, and opposition students and faculties.
Female students were barred from studying certain disciplines, like
agriculture, engineering and the law. (17) New criteria for student
admission and faculty recruitment were added. In addition to meeting
educational criteria, students had to be committed to the Islamic values
and have a letter of recommendation from their local mosque or a respected
and known religious member of their communities. New faculty members were
required to take an ideological test before being hired. Up until the
death of Ayatollah Khomeini on June 3, 1989, these restrictions remained in force,
though both students and the faculty had devised mechanisms of
neutralization and resistance to them.
During this period, numerous Islamic student associations were
established within colleges. New quotas were established for admission of
members of Basij [Mobilization Forces] and Paasdaaraan units, and
high-ranking government officials whose educational degrees were far below
the level traditionally required for the positions they occupied. In later
years, war veterans and their family members also received special quotas.
Students admitted through this policy began to fill in the Islamic
Associations in universities. These associations helped government
officials recruit students not only for participation in the war with
Iraq, but also for various newly established revolutionary institutions
such as Sepaah Paasdaaraan and Jahaad-e Saazandegi (Construction
Corps).(18) They also prepared students to participate in government
rallies, report on anti-government activities of students and criticisms
of Islam and the state ideology by faculty members, and implement state
gender policies by monitoring male-female interactions among students.
Offices like "Islamic Associations, "Paayegaah-e Moqaavemat-e Eslaami"
[Forces of Islamic Resistance], "Jahaad-e Daaneshgaahi" [University Holy
War], and "Student Basij" were all working together to maintain a tight
grip on the pulse of student deeds and thoughts on the
campuses.
It is at this historical juncture that the student movement,
formerly an active, independent, creative, and anti-establishment force,
was transformed into a watchdog of the state whose main task was to
mobilize support for, and suppress the opposition to, the state. This
transformation did not go unnoticed even by Islamic activists. In 1991,
Abdolkarim Soroush complained of lack of intellectual and ideological
creativity and activism among Muslim students in universities.(19) In the
past two years, Abbas Abdi, Seyed Hashem Aghajari, Heshmatollah Tabarzadi,
all active members of these Islamic associations, have begun testifying to
the historical damage to the student movement as a result of this close
affiliation with the state. (20)
3.4. The Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat [The DTV]:
On September 10,
1979, the representatives of Islamic Student Associations held
a national seminar whose participants included the following students:
Ebrahim Asgharzadeh, Mohsen Mirdamadi, and Abbas Abdi. These students
proposed and approved the establishment of the "Etehaadiyeh Anjoman-haaye
Eslaami Daaneshjooyaan va Saayer-e Maraakez-e 'Amoozesh-e 'Ali-ye digar"
[the Union of Islamic Associations of University Students and Other Higher
Educational Centers], in order to strengthen Islamic student associations
and help the development of the Islamic revolution. In order to abbreviate
and convey the mission of the new organization, it was called "Daftar-e
Tahkim-e Vahdat" [The Office for Consolidation and Unity, hereafter DTV].
The DTV has been the largest and most active umbrella student organization
in Iran
since the revolution. It includes a number of students from the MSFIL and
has become the most influential group after the takeover of the US
Embassy.
In the first decade of the revolution, the DTV was closely
affiliated with the radical clerics and many of its members occupied
government positions. It participated in parliamentary and presidential
elections of 1983 and 1987 by presenting its own list of candidates.
Currently, it has 50 voting member associations representing state
universities and 30 non-voting associations representing Islamic Azaad
universities (which has branches in major cities in the country). Islamic
associations in the latter universities, numbering 70 according to its
Chancellor, do not have the same level of freedom enjoyed by students in
state universities. Student organizations in the Islamic Azaad
universities are controlled tightly by the conservative clerics in the IR,
and the university leadership uses heavy-handed disciplinary measures
against students engaged in any protest, political or non-political. (21)
In all universities, lack of freedom of expression remains a consistent
student complaint. The Komiteh Enzebaati [Disciplinary Committee] in
universities has become a major source of censorship and suppression of
freethinking. Students who raise undesirable issues in class or among
themselves will be called in later for the violation of unwritten speech
codes. (22)
Concerned about the radical influence and left-leaning
tendencies of the DTV, the Jame'eh-ye Roohaaniyat-e Mobaarez (The Militant
Clergy Association, hereafter as JRM) and its conservative ally, the
Jamiyat-e Motalefeh Eslaami (the Society of Islamic Coalition, hereafter
JME) felt the need to influence developments in universities and gain
support for their programs among students. In 1979, with the encouragement
from Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Seyed Ali Khamenei, a student named
Heshmatollah Tabarzadi and a number of his friends, who had earlier worked
in the Markaze Shohadaaye Haftaado-dutan [The Cultural Center for 72
Martyrs] and had close ties to them, joined the DTV's Central Council.
(23) Within the Council, Tabarzadi promoted policies countering the
leftist students. Soon the DTV had two unannounced factions: Khate
Emaami-ha [The Line of Imam Students], associated with the leftist
faction, and the more conservative and smaller faction supporting the JRM.
Tabarzadi represented the latter faction. This faction started its own
separate activities in 1983.(24)
After 1988, when the JRM broke into two factions during the
third parliamentary elections and the Majma-e Roohaaniyoon-e Mobaarez-e
Tehran (Tehran Militant
Clerics League, hereafter MRMT) was created, the DTV moved closer to the
MRMT. With the decline of the leftist faction's fortune during 1989-1996,
the DTV lost its influence within the government - an issue I will discuss
later. Many of its influential members began careers in political
journalism and joined the leftist papers such as Salaam and Asr-e Maa.
Some joined followers of Abdolkarim Soroush in the monthly
Kiyaan.
3.5. The Tabarzadi Group or the EEADD:
In 1987, Heshmatollah Tabarzadi broke rank with the DTV. He
established the Ettehaadiyeh Eslaami-ye Anjoman-haaye Daaneshjooyaan-e
Daaneshgaah-haa va Maraakez-e 'Amoozesh-e 'Ali [Islamic Union of
Associations of University Students and Higher Educational Centers, known
as Tabarzadi Group] and himself became its first General Secretary. When
he graduated from the university, Tabarzadi changed the name of the
association to Ettehaadiyeh Eslaami-ye Anjoman-haaye Daaneshjooyaan va
Daanesh-'amookhtegaan-e Daaneshgaah-haa va Maraakez-e 'Amoozesh-e 'Ali
[the Islamic Union of Islamic Associations of Students and Alumni of
Universities and Other Higher Educational Centers, hereafter EEADD], thus
enabling it to remain in operation.
Although the EEADD sounded like a student organization, it was
not. Article 12 of its constitution stipulated that "the organization
consists of members from the following six groups: university students,
teachers, educated [Farhangiyaan], university alumni
[Daanesh-'amookhtegaan], workers, and civil servants."(25) The EEADD's
strength was in its vocal, ambitious, astute character of its secretary,
not in its small following, which did not even compare with the DTV. In
1988, it published its first magazine, Naameh-ye Payaam-e Daaneshjoo-ye
Basiji.
3.6. Student Apathy and Alienation: A
general characteristic of student movements is their criticism of the
establishment. These movements are often critical of conditions harmful to
freedom of thinking, growth of knowledge, and the development of society.
When a student movement loses this criticality and becomes associated with
the establishment, it no longer attracts students' attention. One of the
reasons we see no sign of a lively student movement during 1981-1989 in
Iran is
that student activism became a part of the government structure. When the
structure of universities and their curriculum are controlled by the
state, it is no surprise that there are no independent student
movements.
In the decade and a half after the Cultural Revolution, the
student movement was an "official movement" in which student organizations
were part of the government structures. Their members were screened for
their ideological loyalty and were mobilized for official causes.(26) This
resulted in alienation of the majority of students from these bodies.
Rampant fear of members of Islamic student associations as spies for
government and the heavy presence of government agents on campuses
resulted in widespread apathy and political disenchantment. These
associations had lost their appeal as organizations in which genuine
student concerns were to be addressed and issues were to be analyzed
critically and creatively - functions usually associated with student
organizations around the world. (27)
4. The Student Movement during Rafsanjani's
Presidency
Up until now, the political tendencies and conflicts within the
ruling clergy coexisted without any open confrontation. Ayatollah Khomeini
was able to skillfully mediate or suppress them, if necessary. Also, all
political factions and influential leaders in the IRI courted Islamic
Student Associations, even though there were efforts to exploit these
organizations for factional causes. With Khomeini's death in June 1989,
these conflicts and tendencies erupted. Factionalism began to shape the
events of the next decade. Universities did not remain unaffected by this
development. Islamic Associations in universities began to reflect these
political tendencies more clearly. There were two visible trends among the
student organizations. Students following the first trend viewed and
supported the clergy as the true representative of Islamic ideals and saw
their task as acting in the interest of the state.(28) Students following
the second trend believed that they were revolutionary vanguards who
should remain vigilant against the penetrating forces of the enemies, as
well as uphold the original values of the revolution. (29) The former was
under the influence of the JRM and the latter was close to the MRMT and
the MSFIL. The former group was also receiving support and encouragement
from the JME. At this juncture, Tabarzadi's EEADD was supportive of
Rafsanjani and worked closely with the rightist faction (which included
both the JME and the JRM).
Prior to his death, Khomeini had ordered a
revision of the constitution, thus preparing the ground for his political
absence. Immediately after his death, the revised constitution was
approved, Khamenei was promoted to the rank of Ayatollah and appointed as
the Leader, and Rafsanjani was elected as the new President. At this time,
Khamenei and Rafsanjani felt that they had to do away with the
unpredictability and instability of the earlier revolutionary policies,
which were effective at destroying the old structures but detrimental to
normalization of the status of the IR in the world scene. Rafsanjani
gathered a coalition of technocrats interested in reconstructing the war
economy by privatizing industries, attracting foreign capital,
reorganizing earlier labor-management relationships, and reversing the
declining standard of living. To achieve these objectives, the IR also had
to warm up to the West by toning down the revolutionary rhetoric in its
foreign policy and normalizing its relationships with the conservative
Arab countries in the region.
The most visible characteristic of new
developments was a departure from the past revolutionary policies and a
return to normalcy. Radical individuals who had served in high-ranking
positions during Khomeini's rule were isolated and pushed out of the
mainstream. Meritocracy and specialization were to replace mere
revolutionary commitment and loyalty to clergy as criteria for appointment
to government positions. Student radicalism was also to be controlled.
Starting on November 4, 1991, the government brought the
anniversary of the Embassy takeover under its own control, thus signaling
the end to the radicalism of the DTV.
These policies and changes did not sit well
with the conservative clerics in the JRM and merchants affiliated with the
JME. Though their slogan during the fifth parliamentary election was
"Follow the Imam, obey the Leadership, and support Hashemi," they did not
appreciate Rafsanjani's cultural openness and reliance on technocratic
solutions to economic matters. Even during the election the hard-liners
discovered that their tactical alliance might not work well for them. They
changed their slogan to "social justice and extension of popular
participation and supervision."(30) These developments impacted Islamic
associations and their memberships. While radical students in the DTV
questioned the political aspects of some of these policies, others were
concerned with their resultant economic displacement among social groups.
In general, radical students began to feel divorced from the rightist
faction. They complained of corruption by government officials both inside
and outside of universities and argued for protection of the poor in the
face of the newly adopted economic liberalization. These complaints were
expressed through writing and lecturing.
Students affiliated with the JRM, who were
originally supporters of Rafsanjani and had helped him and Khamenei to
isolate the leftist faction in the fourth parliamentary elections in 1991,
expressed concerns about cultural laxity and financial corruption among
Rafsanjani allies in the government. In 1994, the EEADD engaged in the
most daring political challenge to the Kaargozaaraan-e Saazandegi
[Executives of Construction].(31) They made a series of allegations
against Rafsanjani family, his associates, and the Bonyaad Mostazafaan va
Jaanbaazaan [Foundation of the Oppressed and War Veterans, hereafter BMJ]
in the Naameh-ye Payaam-e Daaneshjoo-ye Basiji. The right began to fight
back. After an early complaint, Tabarzadi had to drop the word "Basiji"
from the title of the weekly. Later, it was warned that it should stop
"telling lies and defaming public officials." Continuing its revelations,
the EEADD was forced to vacate its office because it was owned by the BMJ.
In June 1995, the Ansar ransacked their office and several members were
injured. No one was arrested. In 1996, the Daftar-e Rahbari [The Office of
Leadership] informed Tabarzadi that "his work was no longer satisfactory
to them," (32) thus cutting any relationship that had existed up to that
point. Two weeks later, Naameh-ye Payaam-e Daaneshjoo was banned and
Tabarzadi was barred from serving as an editor for five years.
5. The Student
Movement during Khatami's Presidency
5.1. Structural
Changes in the Iranian universities and Society: Khatami's election
in 1997 was a turning point in the life of the student movement in the
IRI. The Iran of 1997 was no
longer the same country inherited by Khomeini in 1979 or by Khamenei and
Rafsanjani in 1989. The number of students in universities and higher
education institutions, which originally declined from 140,000 before the
revolution to 117,148 after the cultural revolution (1982-83 academic
year), began to have an annual growth rate of 13 percent for the decade of
1980s. After the war with Iraq, the student
body increased at a higher rate. Prior to Khatami's election [5/23/1997],
there were 1,150,000 students in Iranian universities and higher education
institutions.(33) Facing increasing unemployment, high inflation, and
bleak economic outlook, many students had lost hope in being able to
secure a decent future.(34) Alienation, disillusion, frustration,
depression, and deviance among youth of all ages had increased
considerably. Iranian journals were full of reports of despair, anomie,
and hopelessness among the youth.(35) Social problems were aggravated by
vigilantes' constant intrusion into the lives of the youth and women, who
were forced to comply with strict Islamic codes of dress and behavior.
With the doubling in size of the population between 1978 and 1996, the
number of institutions of higher education increased as well. Since the
revolution, the composition of the student body in universities has
changed dramatically. During the Pahlavi era, most students entering the
Iranian universities were males from urban centers. In the early years of
the monarchy, most of these students were from upper middle and upper
classes. After the Shah's White Revolution [1962], more middle class and
few bright lower class students found their way to universities. The oil
boom of the 1970s opened universities to many more lower and lower-middle
class students.
In the early 1980s, many secular students
and those affiliated with non-Islamic political organizations were purged
from universities. A significant number of upper and upper-middle class
families sent their sons and daughters to universities abroad. As a result
of this and other government policies, the number of rural and lower class
students in state universities increased tremendously. The emphasis on
moral admission standards, as well as the admission quotas for war veteran
family members, Basijis, Paasdaars, and other favored groups, changed the
character of the student body both qualitatively and quantitatively.
Poorer but more traditional students entered these universities. Middle
and upper middle class students failing to make it to state universities
found it easier to pay higher tuition for the Islamic Azaad universities.
In the second decade of the IR rule, another trend in the university
admission emerged: increasing female admission to universities and in
varied fields.(36) In 1999, for the first time in the history of the
Iranian higher education, the number of female students admitted to
universities surpassed the number of admitted male students by a figure of
about 20,000. (37) This represents four percent higher admission rate for
female students than that of male students.
5.2. Rebirth of Student Activism and the Conservative
Reaction: The election of Mohammad Khatami as president was the
result of an unprecedented coalition of several forces in the Iranian
society: disenchanted and angry masses of youth and women, politically
isolated and angry supporters of the Islamic left (the DTV, the MRMT, and
the Saazemaan-e Mojaahedin-e Enqelaab-e Eslaami [the Islamic Revolution
Holy Warriors Organization, hereafter SMEE]), the Kaargozaaraan-e
Saazandegi, the NAI, and a large segment of the Iranian public variably
dissatisfied with the policies of the IR. Khatami's election gave rise to
an unprecedented new form of student activism in universities. In fact,
student participation in the election and support for Khatami were crucial
in bringing him to power.
The movement that brought Khatami to power
reshaped the landscape of student organizations. Since Tabarzadi was no
longer a student and had lost his membership in the DTV, he began to
encourage the development of a series of parallel student organizations
outside of the EEADD. Though he was hoping to push his agenda through
these organizations, the newly established organizations took on a life of
their own and became major players in the events of July 1999. These
organizations included the Jebhe-ye Mottahede-ye Daaneshjoo-i" [the United
Student Front], the Anjoman-e Defaa az Zendaaniyaane Siyaasi [Society for
Defense of Political Prisoners, hereafter ADZS] and the Anjoman-e
Daaneshjooyaan-e Roushanfekr [Society of Intellectual Students, hereafter
ADR] - all three members of the EEADD. Manouchehr Mohammadi organized the
latter two. Mohammadi was a Basiji student who had entered the university
through the quota system allocated for Basij. He was one of the founders
of a student organization originally supported by the conservative faction
in the IR: the Jaame'eh-ye Eslaami-ye Daaneshjooyaan-e Daaneshkadeh-ye
Eqtesaad-e Daaneshgaah-e Tehran [Society of Islamic
Students in the College of Economics, Tehran University]. Mohammadi
failed to pass several of his courses and was first put under probation
and then expelled from the university. (38)
The conservatives viewed these developments
with alarm and surprise. In reaction to widespread support for Khatami in
universities, the conservative members of the Majles introduced a new bill
for establishing a Basij unit in each university in order "to defend the
achievements of the Islamic Revolution and advance Basiji thinking." The
measure was meant to keep the activities of the DTV and other student
groups under control. On October 4, 1998, the bill was approved. To
supervise the implementation of these units, the "Shoraaye 'Ali-ye
Hamaahangi va Hemaayat az Basij-e Daaneshjoo-i" [the High Council for
Coordination and Support of Student Basij] was established. (39) A major
task of these units, in addition to encouraging student participation in
"educational plans," was to engage in "disciplinary activities" in
universities. The DTV opposed the new measure. Referring to a measure
approved by the Council for Cultural Revolution in 1990, according to
which the Basiji could recruit members in universities, the DTV questioned
the motivation behind the new bill. According to the DTV's statement, the
new measure was to help conservatives to "monopolize universities."(40) In
response, the political officer of the Student Basij in Tehran University indicated that
the earlier measure did not allow it "to play its role in a desired
manner."(41) These new Basiji unites became a major source of grievance
for students on campuses because their activities were interruptive,
suppressive, and militaristic.
Despite these measures, the conservatives
could not lose sight of the great danger re-emergence of student
activities posed for the regime. A month after the establishment of these
units, Hojatoleslam Irandoust argued that their existence was necessary
for "Islamization of universities." He warned: "student organizations in
universities are like a two-edged sword. If the management in the
university does not pay adequate attention, they can become a major
obstacle in the implementation of [Basij] units. Political organizations
are necessary but the danger and damages of non-Islamic organizations are
grave."(42)
To counter Khatami's liberalization
policies and dampen any hope of revitalization of the opposition to the
regime, a group of intelligence officers intensified their earlier policy
of physical elimination of intellectual and political opposition to the
IR. On November 22, 1998, a group of agents brutally
murdered Daryoush Forouhar, the leader of the Hezbe Mellate
Iran [the Nation
Party of Iran], and his wife Parvaneh Eskandari. A few weeks later,
several Iranian intellectuals, Majid Sharif, Mohammad Jafar Pooyandeh, and
Mohammad Mokhtari were abducted and murdered. These murders, and the
manner, in which they were carried out, shocked the nation. The revelation
that agents from the Ministry of Intelligence were responsible for these
murders added to the public demands for accountability in the government
and security for citizens. Public protests during the funeral services of
these personalities added fuel to the burning desires of the nation for
political freedom and punishment of the perpetrators. Students became an
important element of these protests. These events brought various students
groups closer to one another and fueled their nationalist sentiments.
Tabarzadi's EEADD, some elements of the DTV, and many other students
started to develop a sympathetic attitude toward nationalist, secular, and
leftist opposition.(43) Pictures of Mossadeq, a national hero shunned by
the conservatives, were displayed in student rallies, even in rallies by
the DTV.
These events, and the repressive measures
taken by the conservative forces in the judiciary, security forces, and
the Ministry of Intelligence, resulted in further radicalization of the
students in universities. The DTV became an active supporter of Khatami's
reform measures and engaged in numerous protests opposing conservative
attacks on his policies. Whenever there was a confrontation between
Khatami's supporters and conservatives, students were quick to defend
socio-political freedom, human rights, and democratic change. Heshmatollah
Tabarzadi, the leader of the EEADD, became a Khatami supporter and
increased his political activities. He also had a change of heart
regarding the Velaayate Faqih [the rule of supreme jurisprudence] -
something he had supported and worked for in the past. In several
demonstrations he issued resolutions calling for an election and
limitation on the tenure of the Leadership, i.e. the Vali-ye Faqih. In
April, 1999, he began a new paper called Hoviyat-e Khish, in which he
continued to attack "political despotism" in the IR and explained how the
ruling groups had abused religious sentiments for political gains. The
paper was banned after three issues and Tabarzadi and Hossein Kashani, its
editor, were arrested in June 1999.
6. The July
Protests
6.1. Politics of
Protest in Universities: The emergence of popular protest against the
IR government in Iran is not new.
Since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the IRI has experienced several
mass protests.(44) Many of these protests have been economic in nature.
The economic hardships resulting from the war, mismanagement, corruption,
and decline in industrial production, and increasing migration of the
rural population to cities have eroded the aspirations of the
disadvantaged Iranians who bought into the popular promises of the
revolution. This latest student protest, though not motivated by economic
factors, is the last in the list of uprisings in the IRI. Though this
latest uprising has a lot to do with political developments in the
country, it represents the strongest manifestation of the structural
crises unsettling the IRI.
To understand the complicated nature of the
latest protests and how they evolved, it is important to make some
distinctions between different kinds of student protests in the IRI.
Grievances provoking student reactions have been of two kinds: political
and non-political. Non-political grievances include lack of resources,
teachers, adequate housing, quality food, and mistreatment of students.
The government has always been sensitive to any collective action by
students, even non-political ones. Therefore, even non-political demands
have been treated as political, and student rallies for such grievances
have often been quickly dispersed or crushed brutally in cases of
non-compliance. While Ayatollah Khomeini was alive, there were no serious
student collective actions against the IR government. Most student rallies
were orchestrated by the government and in support of its causes.
Student rallies against state policies
began during Rafsanjani administration. Again, as indicated above, many of
these rallies were factional in nature and involved students from the DTV.
However, in the early 1990s we begin to see independent student rallies
against university policies affecting student lives. Iranian universities
began to experience two sets of protest distinguishable by their factional
nature. Non-factional protests are those not motivated or supported by any
of the political factions among the ruling clerics. They may or may not be
political, but are treated as political and are more threatening to the IR
than the factional ones. If not controlled quickly, they have a tendency
to tap into the general frustrations generated by the political and
economic policies of the IR. The state is very keen to thwart these
sources of dissatisfaction and not allow them to surface.
These types of rallies were usually
spontaneous and in response to problems affecting students' academic or
physical well being. They were often small, involving 50-500 students, and
took place in most universities around the country. For instance, in 1997
there were sit-ins against food poisoning, water poisoning, and lack of
teachers, laboratories, and classrooms in many universities. (45) The two
biggest non-political grievances causing serious difficulties for the
regime were the housing issue in the Shahid Beheshti University and the quality
of food in Tehran University in January
1997. When hard-line vigilantes intervened and attacked students, the
protests turned violent. Students were beaten, windows were broken, and
food was thrown on the floor. (46) The last two years have seen numerous
rallies and sit-ins in universities, especially in the Islamic Azaad
universities. A major cause of these is the non-responsiveness of the
officials to students' concerns. Just prior to the July unrest in
Tehran University, there were
several public protests by students in the Islamic Azaad universities in
Lar, Qum, Tehran, Qa-emshahr, and
Mash-had.(47)
Factional protests are often prompted by
political disputes outside of universities. Student organizations,
especially the DTV, which is a supporter of leftist faction, have been
dragged into the fight, thus engaging in building pressure against the
conservatives. For instance, this year students held numerous rallies,
issued several statements, and passed many resolutions against various
conservative policies initiated by the Judiciary and the Majles for
preventing the reformist from gaining power. These policies include the
Guardian Council's Nezaarat-e Esteswaabi [Approbatory Supervision, based
on which the Council can disqualify any candidate deemed undesirable
without any explanation], the proposed Bill for Revision of the Press
Laws, and the arrest of Hojatoleslam Kadivar and Tehran Mayor
Gholamhossein Karbaschi.(48) The strategy of the reformists, as formulated
by Said Hajarian, one of the closest allies and advisors to President
Khatami, is "to build up pressure at the bottom but negotiate at the
top."(49) As I will discuss in the next section, the July events started
as a factional protest, went through a non-factional phase, and ended by a
factional coalition. Though they began as a spontaneous reaction to the
brutal attack on student hostels, parts of events were factionally
engineered.(50)
6.2. Developments Leading to the Attack:
Conservative forces had been discussing the idea of a massive
intervention in order to intimidate the enemies of the Valet-e Faqih, with
a justification religiously known as "Nosrat-e belra'b" [victory by using
fear], for sometimes. (51) During the months May and June 1999, their
newspapers published numerous complaints against student activities
violating the sanctities of Islam and the IR. These complaints often
carried a warning that if the Khatami administration did not stop these
student demonstrations, "people," "families of martyrs," and "devotees of
Islam and the revolution" would intervene and take the matters in their
own hands. On May 5, 1999, Abrar, a newspaper affiliated with the
conservative faction, went further and predicted that these "refuses of
the World Arrogance" [a reference to the United States] would be purged
from the student scene "in an appropriate time" or "even maybe soon."
There were countless hints in other conservative papers that things in the
student quarters, especially regarding the DTV and student groups
organized outside of universities - like groups affiliated with
Heshmatollah Tabarzadi and Manouchehr Mohammadi - were getting out of hand
and an intervention was necessary. (52)
On July 7, 1999, the Majles approved the
outlines of a tough new press law. The day before, Salaam, a radical
newspaper run by leftist cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Mousavi-Khoeiniha, had
published a letter written by Said Emami, the intelligent officer who had
masterminded the serial murders and allegedly killed himself in prison.
The letter basically argued against the freedom of the press and for
tougher press laws. Following an intelligence ministry complaint for
publishing a "top secret" document, Salaam was ordered closed.
6.3. The Attack on the Student Dormitory: At
9:30 P.M.
on July 8,
1999, some 200 students, mostly affiliated with the DTV, staged
a peaceful protest in front of their dormitories at the Koo-ye
Daaneshgaah-e Tehran in Amiraabaad. Students
left their compound and moved their rallies into Jalal Al-Ahmad
Avenue. Local security forces intervened and
demanded students return to their hostels. The students ended their
demonstration and returned to the campus. A few students remained in front
of the dormitory and continued their conversations. Around 00:45 A.M. on July 9,
the Acting Chief of Tehran Police arrived on the scene in plain clothes.
With him, large groups of security forces also arrived. He engaged in a
discussion with the students. The director of the dormitory complex also
arrived and attempted to persuade the Acting Chief to move his forces
away. The dormitory was surrounded by security forces [Niroohaaye
Entezaami], the anti-riot police [yegaan-e Vizheh], and some plain-clothed
individuals, whom were thought to be the Ansar. Both groups were engaged
in shouting slogans for and against political freedom, student movement,
and Khatami's reforms. The situation was tense and a serious confrontation
was imminent. Fear spread among the students and many began to join the
crowd outside of the compound.
Having learned about a planned attack that
would "finish the matter once and for all,"(53) several officials from
Khatami administration rushed to the scene in the hope of defusing the
situation.(54) The Interior Minister ordered the security forces to leave
the scene but they refused. With the intervention of Mostafa Tajzadeh, the
Political and Security Deputy of Interior Ministry, students returned to
their dormitories assured that there would not be any attack or
retaliation. Convinced that there would be no attack anymore, government
officials also left the scene. However, the security forces and the plain
clothed forces remained.
By 3:30 A.M., "an organized force of some 400
men - wearing uniforms of black trousers and white shirts and carrying
distinctive blue batons - broke into the dormitories, systematically
ransacked student rooms, and assaulted students indiscriminately. They
beat them with the blue batons and threw some of them out of windows. They
also took many students into detention." (55) In words of a lawyer and
Human Rights Watch researcher, the attackers were "not the irregular mob
of zealots known as the Ansar-e Hezbollah," as was perceived and reported
by most media. This "was an altogether more disciplined and more sinister
force that was bused to the student dormitories for a specific task,
carried it out with ruthless efficiency, and then withdrew as stealthily
as it had appeared, taking with it dozens of students who have not been
seen since."(56) All newspaper accounts refer to this group as "pressure
groups" or the Ansar-e Hezbollah. A clue to their identity is found in the
Report issued by the Investigative Committee of the Supreme National
Security Council [hereafter SNSC]. The report speaks of two kinds of
"plain-clothed individuals" at the scene, a group affiliated with the
security forces and another "from the known groups." The report also
refers to "some other individuals" and to the acronym "NOPO" and the
presence of its commander.(57) As we learn from a short note in Iran Farda
magazine, NOPO stands for Niroo-haaye Vizheh-ye Payro-e Velaayat [Special
Forces Following the Supreme Leader]. This is a secretly trained force for
special operations.(58)
The attacks were massive, damages vast, and
casualties high. Students themselves were not the only targets. Rooms were
searched, personal properties were destroyed, cash found in the rooms was
taken, and pictures and books were torn and/or burned. Ten buildings and
800 rooms were damaged. Windows of some houses and cars parked in
Kargar
Shomaali Avenue were also broken. The injured
were taken to Shariati and Imam Khomeini hospitals. According to an
official in Shariati Hospital, most injured were transferred to Security
Forces' Hospital immediately.(59) Iranian newspapers reported five people
killed and dozens more wounded.(60) Security forces denied the killing and
claimed one death and three injured.
These attacks were so severe and the
damages were so extensive that they could neither be covered up nor left
without a response. Government officials and religious leaders began to
offer their apologies to the students for what had taken place. The
Minister of Culture and Higher Education and the chancellor of Tehran University as well as the
heads of 18 colleges offered their resignation in protest. Khatami
condemned the deadly raid and asked for calm. The news of the attack
brought thousands of students together in protest, first in Tehran University, and later in
universities in eight other cities. Events in Tabriz also had turned violent
and claimed a life. However, they did not receive national attention until
days after the unrest ended.
The Islamic Student Association of the
University of Tehran condemned the
attack and called for a sit-in protest on campus at 11:00 A.M.(61)
Students began to differ on how to proceed. The DTV wanted to stay on
campus and press for their demands. A group of students, referred to by a
report as "populists," wanted to expand the protest and involve the
public.(62) While the former group stayed on campus and continued its
protest, the latter group took to the streets. Thousands of students took
to the streets to demand the dismissal of police chief Hedayat Lotfian,
the man behind most crackdowns of student protests in Tehran.(63) The
government said it had arrested a Tehran police commander and his deputy,
and a third officer had already been disciplined over the bloody incident.
However, it refused to meet students' other demands, especially removal of
Lotfian. Numerous Khatami supporters went to student rallies and tried to
convince them to remain calm and not allow "saboteurs" and "infiltrators"
take advantage of their cause.
Student demands kept changing with the
developments. Their original protest prior to the raid was against the new
press law and the closure of Salaam. After the raid, their demands
centered around the return of victim's bodies, removal of the head of
security forces, identification and punishment of plain clothed
individuals involved in the raid, the accountability for the attack by the
Leader, an apology to students for insults they were subjected to during
the raid, medical and psychological attention for the injured,
compensation for damages, and so on. In the subsequent days, as the
government remained slow in responding to their demands, the students
became bolder and more frustrated, thus using more critical and radical
slogans. With the increasing violence from the security forces and
vigilantes, student slogans also became more violent in both expression
and content.
On July 12, Ayatollah Khamenei addressed a
select group of students, condemning the use of force by police as
"unacceptable and warning the students of plots by foreign enemies. He
also asked the Basij and security forces to deal with "agitators" and
"seditious elements" who had penetrated the student ranks vigorously. The
government announced a ban on demonstrations to quell the unrest. Up to
this point, student demonstrations were spontaneous reaction to the
attack. However, from this point on, the events enter into a different
mode.
6.4. The Crackdown: Cutting the Losses and Going on an
Offensive: The conservative forces had planned to punish students and
teach them a lesson so that there would be no more student protests. They
made three costly mistakes. First, they assumed that it was the end of the
semester and final exams had finished. True, it was the end of the
semester but for some reasons final exams had been postponed for a week,
and students were still preparing for exams. Second, they assumed that an
attack on students would go un-noticed by the public and there would be no
major reaction, as was the case with previous raids. Events turned out to
be different. On that night, people in Amiraabaad area came to the
protection of the students, joined them in their protest, and gave refuge
to students running from police attacks. Third, up until now the Khatami
administration had refused to intervene in various operations by the Ansar
and security forces. The conservative thought that this time would not be
any different. In fact, it was. Knowing that a plot was in the work,
Khatami administration's officials showed up on the scene and attempted to
avert the raid. This intervention, plus active exposure given to the
events by the reformist newspapers like Neshat, Khordad, and Sob-he
Emrooz, publicized and exposed the nature of the operation. The depth of
brutality applied, the identity of the forces involved, and the
deterioration of the relationships between the two major political
factions within the IR were also exposed.(64) In the words of an anonymous
university professor in Tehran, quoted by a reporter, ''now Khatami is the
hero again, the reformist students the martyrs and the traditionalists
(conservatives) the bad guys and the big losers,''(65)
Having lost the battle in the first round,
the conservatives pulled their act and forces together and put a damage
control mechanism into place. They saw to it that the public sympathy
toward students be transformed into antipathy by creating the image of
imminent political chaos and social instability. On July 13, when
thousands of students gathered outside Tehran University defying the ban
on demonstrations, the club-wielding Ansars provoked student rallies into
violence. Anti-riot police interrupted sit-ins rallies, attacked students,
and arrested as many as they could. While the DTV attempted to keep
students calm and inside the campus, some students responded to the Ansar,
Basijis, and security forces. Violence broke out and the situation got out
of control. Students barricaded themselves inside the campus and
neighboring streets. Police sealed off the area. Armed with batons and
tear gas, riot police, Basiji force, and the Ansar battled with students
in the streets surrounding Tehran University. A cinema and
several banks were vandalized, and a dozen cars were set on fire. Protests
spread to other cities despite appeals for calm by the clerical,
religious-nationalist, and DTV leaders. Soon, the IR government whose
Secretary of the Expediency Council, Mohsen Rezaie, had characterized as
"one in which there is zero possibility of violence" just a month earlier,
was engulfed in the most massive violent protest since its inception.
(66)
Khatami supporters, the DTV, and many
professional and cultural associations defending reforms planned a
demonstration supporting students for Tuesday, July 13. The security
forces and conservatives lost no time in hijacking this event. They
announced a larger and wider demonstration in support of the "system" for
Wednesday, July 14, and all other demonstrations were banned. The Khatami
administration, his reformist supporters, and even the DTV felt bounded to
support the call. Tens of thousands of Khamenei supporters and government
functionaries were bussed to Tehran. The demonstration was
meant to be a show of force and determination by the conservative forces
and support for the Leader. Many Khatami supporters who showed up at the
rally were identified and beaten up. Khatami's pictures were taken down
and no slogan un-supportive of Ayatollah Khamenei was allowed to be
displayed. (67)
On July 19, Kayhan published the text of a
letter written to President Khatami by 24 senior officers in the Sepaah-e
Paasdaaraan four days after the attack. The letter denounced the President
for policies that were heading the IR toward anarchy. Warning that they
could not "stand by idly watching" the ruins, Paasdaaraan warned the
President that they might have to take matters into their own hands
because their "reservoir of patience" was "running low." Two weeks later,
the Ansar official paper, Ya Lessarsat al-Hossein, suggested "arming the
Ansar for a better defense of the revolution" - a suggestion which had
been made to the SNSC a decade ago.(68) A week later, re-affirmiting their
commitment to the "Imam" and the "system," 50,000 Basijis gathered in a
military camp in Tehran and engaged in exercises in preparation for
fighting the enemies of the revolution. (69)
6.5. The Blame Game, Continued Arrests, and Closed
Door Trials: In the subsequent days, the Intelligence Ministry called
on all Iranians to turn in protesters. The United
States and other foreign countries were
blamed for instigating unrest. The Investigative Committee established for
looking into events by the SNSC, chaired by the President, issued its
report.(70) The report said little about the causes of the unrest and the
identity of plain-clothed security forces. It minimized the planned nature
of the raid by faulting the agitated mood of the students and the presence
of pressure groups on the scene.(71) It also mentioned that the security
forces were not prepared for the task and that an acting commander had
behaved inappropriately. Clearly, the report was a compromise between the
members of the two factions in the SNSC.
The DTV accused the security forces and
their allies, the Ansar, for being behind the original attack and later
violence. Referring to the violence in Tehran, DTV spokesman Ali
Afshari said: "Everything was suspect from the beginning. From the extent
of the damage throughout Tehran and the speed with which
it was carried out, it could not possibly have been the work of students."
He claimed that "the way the riots spread into different neighborhoods was
clearly the work of professionals."(72) Abbas Abdi, the editor of banned
Salaam and one of the MSFIL, saw "the source of the attack in the same
"clique" [Mahfel] who committed serial killings."(73) Mohammad Salaamati,
the General Secretary of the SMEE, expressed the same view.(74)
While pro-Khatami papers claimed that the
conservatives orchestrated the violence in a bid against Khatami
government, the conservatives denied any responsibility and accused
pro-Khatami papers of encouraging students and creating an atmosphere of
crisis.(75) Asadollah Badamchian, one of the most influential leaders of
the JME, argued that the "left" provoked the security forces to this
action in order to create "a few martyrs" for their cause.(76) Masoud
Dehnamaki, an Ansar leader, rejected any involvement by the Ansar and
argued that "events were guided by the extreme left."(77) Ayatollah
Jannati, the Chair of the Guardian Council, reduced the cause of the event
to "mistakes by several officers on the scene" and criticized the report
by the Investigative Committee of the SNSC. He stated that "this attack
[on students] had nothing to do with the regime. Mistakes by a few
officers have nothing to do with the government or the system."(78) In a
statement issued on July 26, 1999, the Intelligence Ministry accused
"the nationalists, Monaafeqin [a reference to the Mojaahedin-e Khalq-e
Iran), Marxists, and
communists, with the support of "imperialists and Zionists" of penetrating
student ranks and planning to "create chaos" and "damage the Islamic
system."
Conservative forces working in the
Intelligence Ministry and Judiciary went on a broad offensive. Students
were arrested in herds. Opposition leaders were either arrested or called
in for interrogation. Complaints were lunched against editors and writers
for their comments and views contrary to national interest, Islam, and the
leadership. Salaam, which was supposed to resume publication during the
unrest, remained closed, and later its owner was tried and convicted of
violating press laws. Secret trials were held for student leaders. Several
students were forced to confess to minor, and often irrelevant, contacts
with the Iranian opposition abroad. On September 21, 1999, the head of
Tehran's revolutionary tribunal
claimed that his tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction over the student case
and "he might or might not deem it necessary to consider the findings" of
the Investigative Committee of the SNSC. He also announced that four
alleged ringleaders of the unrest had been condemned to death at a
closed-door hearing, without providing students' names.(79) This was the
first announcement of the outcome of legal proceedings against the roughly
1,500 individuals arrested in connection with the riots. Another
revolutionary court sentenced 21 students to prison sentences of between
three months and nine years for simultaneous unrest in Tabriz. On October 17,
1999, the Tehran tribunal sentenced
another student to two and half years in jail in connection with the
unrest. On the same day, a report in Araya weekly indicated that Maryam
(Malus) Radnia, a member of the "Shoraaye Daaneshjooyaan-e Motehassen"
[Student Sit-In Council] involved in directing demonstrations, had been
sentenced to death. On October 28, Quds daily reported that the
revolutionary tribunal has sentenced Manouchehr Mohammadi, leader of the
ADZS and ADR, to 13 years in prison. The news of these closed door trials,
forced confessions, torture, and interrogation of arrested students have
shocked Iranian intellectuals, opposition forces inside and outside the
country, international human rights organization, and even foreign
governments. They have asked that these convictions be overturned.
President Khatami has expressed hope that the Leader would pardon these
students and save them from the execution. The DTV has also denounced
these trials and asked for open trials and better treatment of arrested
students. The security forces have put a tight control over the
information about the attack on the dormitory, police reaction, court
procedures, and the students involved. On October 29, acting on a
complaint by police over publication of the photos of the bloody attack, a
court ordered a student magazine called Anjoman to be closed. (80)
6.6. Organization and Demands of Protesters: The
emergence of these protests was both natural and accidental, just like the
election of Mohammad Khatami to presidency in 1997. Natural because this
is what happens when there are violations of basic human rights, political
oppression, and economic inequality. Accidental because these protests
were not planned. They were spontaneous reactions to harmful and
threatening situations. The conservative might have had a plan of action
but the students did not. Given the fact that the developments were
momentum-driven rather than planned, it was no surprise that the
government could end it quickly and effectively with less physical and
human damage than is often seen in a similar situation.
Massive protests following the pre-mediated
attack on the dormitory were spontaneous but lacked leadership and
coordination between various student associations involved.(81) Even the
SMEE, whose members have been implicated indirectly by the conservatives
in encouraging student protests, acknowledges this fact. Behzad Nabavi,
the leader of the organization, argued that if the student movement was
not so diffused, the dormitory tragedy could have been prevented and the
movement could have been guided through the turbulence.(82) Therefore,
given the organizational nature of these protests, they had reached their
limit. The students had suffered enormously and the regime was not willing
to make any serious concession. The conservatives were determined to use
massive force, if necessary, to end the riots. The students were
disorganized and there was no plan of action. As the protests became
violent and reached beyond the campus, support for the students paled and
became limited and haphazard. Pro-Khatami forces, even those not
affiliated with the establishment, were asking the students to refrain
from violence and let calm prevail.(83) The DTV also issued numerous
statements calling for calm and warning students against extremist actions
"desired by the enemies of Islam and the Islamic system."
Public support for the protests was also
lukewarm. After the initial open support for students who were beaten up
in the dormitory, the public showed no strong desire for expanding these
protests beyond campuses. As a primary school teacher put it in an
interview with a Reuters' correspondent, "people do not see a bright
future with these acts. There is no leadership, no organization. They are
only afraid things will get worse than they already are."(84)
Although it is not my intention to analyze
all student demands and slogans, it is important to pay attention to
several important points about the nature of these demands and how they
compared with earlier student uprisings (85): (a) The anti-imperialism and
anti-Americanism of the pre-revolutionary student movement were absent.
This time, it was in the government organized rallies that such slogans
were used; (b) There were no slogans directly demanding the overthrow of
the IR; (c) There were no slogans against Khatami and his administration.
There were a number of slogans demanding the government to live up to its
promise of a civil society; (d) Ayatollahs Khamenei, many officials
affiliated with the conservative faction, conservative newspapers like
Resaalat and Kayhan, and the Ansar were targets of attack by the students
and were mentioned by name; (e) Students were asking the leaders of the IR
to be accountable for their actions and/or step aside. There were numerous
demands for good government. Opposition to despotic rule and return to
democracy and pluralism were repeated themes; (f) Students were asking the
public to join them and the police to stop the violation of citizens'
rights; (g) Nationalist sentiments underlined many slogans; (h) Students
connected their immediate concerns with those of political prisoners,
including Abbas Amir Entezam, Gholamhossein Karbaschi, and Hojatoleslam
Mohsen Kadivar, and for the victims of serial murders; (i) There was no
slogan with clear ideological mark, except for references to Islam. There
were references to the economic inequalities, social justice, and
political democracy but none bore the mark of any ideological camp such as
socialism, capitalism, or Marxism. There were a number of slogans
demanding Islamic justice and using Islamic symbolism; (j) There were
numerous slogans characterizing the IR as a system against rationality and
modernity; (k) the underlying issues concerning students included
political democracy and basic human rights such as freedoms of expression,
assembly, and belief.
Except a direct attack on Ayatollah
Khamenei and the demand for his removal, none of the above demands were
new. For the past three years at least, students have been asking for
transparency, accountability, integrity, and fairness in the
government.
7. Where to from Here?
These latest student protests, which were
caused by legitimate concerns and demands, had the potential to turn into
a widespread general uprising at the national level. Once it began to
spread to other campuses, and resonated with a public whose list of
grievances were long, the regime realized the danger, and engineered an
effective control plan in order to re-establish law and order in
universities and give the image of being in control.
In the aftermath of these events, the IRI
has begun a two-pronged strategy of using carrot and stick intermittently.
On one hand, the security and intelligence forces have been interrogating,
intimidating, and arresting students, as well as leaders, of the splinter
groups such as Mohammadi's and Tabarzadi' organizations. They also have
used the occasion to crackdown on the activities of nationalist opposition
groups like the Hezb-e Mellat-e Iran, the Nehzate
Azaadi-ye Iran, the Jebhe Melli
Iran, and Pan
Iranists. The Ministry of Intelligence continues to charge these groups
with ties to the United States,
Israel, and other
foreign enemies. The government has also been calling members of the DTV
for interrogation and forcing them to sign statements of non-participation
in any future protest. These arrests, call-ins, and intimidation are often
done without public announcement and exposure, though reports of them are
often leaked to reformist papers supporting President Khatami. These
measures are meant to weaken, discredit and frighten "ghayr-e khodi"
[out-group] opposition groups and individuals, as opposed to "khodis"
[in-group]).(86) The conservatives have made no secret of their
determination to use all means available to maintain their control of
political institutions of the IR and to allow no room for growth of
secular and liberal Islamic opposition forces, especially among the
students where they have the strongest support.
On other hand, calling for a cease-fire in
the factional fight,(87) the conservatives have adopted a conciliatory and
supportive attitude toward student groups affiliated with Islamic
factions. The latter groups have also taken a similar approach. The DTV
continues to criticize both the harsh security measures used against
students and the "subversive radicalism and extremism of students who wish
to destroy the Islamic system." In the wake of the bloody attack and its
subsequent widespread protests, the conservatives have come to the
conclusion that they have to get along with the reformist faction and work
together against what they have termed "the third current," or "ghayr-e
khodis," namely nationalists, secularists, Marxists, and independent
activists who do not support the Islamic system.(88) This is a call that
is received positively, but quietly, by the DTV too.(89)
Given the fact that students were a major
force in the revolution and later in the establishment of an Islamic
government, the IR cannot deny students the right to be political. Unlike
the Pahlavi state whose aim was de-politicization of students, the IR has
always supported politicization of students as long as their political
activities supported the state ideology and policies. On numerous
occasions the Islamic leaders have insisted that students remain
politically active.(90) At the same time, the bitter experiences of the
early years of the revolution, when various groups participating in the
revolution demanded a share of power and opposed the establishment of a
theocratic state, have made the leadership of the IR suspicious of any
opposition outside of the establishment, be it from students or political
parties. The IR cannot afford an independent student movement questioning
its policies, programs, and legitimacy. It is because of this ambivalence
that we have witnessed contradictory remarks by government officials
regarding the politicization of student activities. On one hand, Khamenei
and Rafsanjani argue that students should remain political. On the other
hand, Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri, the parliament speaker and an important
leader of the conservative coalition, tells the students to avoid engaging
in politics.(91) One of the problems facing the IR is that the clerical
leadership has had difficulty balancing its past with the future, its
ideology with the practice, its revolutionary rhetoric with the realities
of political stability, and its radicalism with its conservatism. The
regime wants to have it both ways. It wants to claim that students are
free to organize and be politically active, but only if they are Muslim
and supporters of the IR. It wants to have an active student body, but
only if its activities support the causes of the regime.
The upcoming parliamentary elections in
February 1999 might create enough tensions in universities to instigate
another student rebellion. While such a possibility is not remote, it is
also certain that any student riot will be met by unprecedented security
measures. The regime knows that once student riots begin in universities,
they might easily spread to high schools and main streets. However,
regardless of what the IR government wishes, it is on a path of increasing
conflict with the students. Iran's population is
very young and that is a source of a major problem for this regime. The
Iranian youth are frustrated, angry, and restless. The more the IR
tightens the security, thus limiting young students' freedoms, the more it
adds to tensions which have already passed boiling level. These latest
protests and the government reaction to them have radicalized students and
given them more reasons to engage in future protests.
The immediate consequences of the
suppression of this unrest are setbacks for the re-emerging independent
student organizations and secular activists. In the short run, the
emergence of independent, secular, and nationalist student movement in the
IRI has been stopped in the embryonic stage. However, these events, and
the level of frustration and resentment they have created, have laid the
ground for simultaneous disillusionment from the factionally supported
student organizations. Unconventional methods of resistance to state
policies, especially those regarding socio-political freedoms and student
life, will become more attractive to students who have already paid a high
price for their protests. The current student organizations in
universities are doomed for fractures and dismemberment. Given their
continued reliance on the political factions within the establishment, and
the conciliatory attitudes of their leaders regarding recent developments,
they are bound to lose momentum, enthusiasm, and members. Their existence
has become too dependent on political factions and their affiliated
media.
It is hard to imagine that the suppressed
and frustrated energies of politically disillusioned and physically beaten
students will dissipate soon. Although it is hard to predict how and when
they will be released, it is wrong to assume that they can be suppressed
for long. If there is no natural process of democratization through which
energies reserved in the student movement can be released gradually and
consumed appropriately, these energies will explode as soon as they find
an outlet for discharge. Social unrest in other social arenas or a
disturbance within any university can ignite the fire and provide a
natural outlet for them. What happened in Iranian universities this summer
has laid the foundation for further disturbances that can only be
prevented by genuine democratic process, not by political manipulation and
restrictive rules. Completed on September 1999.
8. Endnotes
1 . See "Iran's second
revolution," The Economist, July 17, 1999.
2. Patrick Clawson quoted by Ben Barber,
"Hard-line Clerics Cling to Power," The Washington Times, July 15,
1999. Hammed Shahidian, "'Aqaaze Paayaan: be ou keh goft:
"mikosham, mikosham..." [The Beginning of the End: To those who said: "I
kill, I kill,..."]. To appear in Noghteh, No. 9. Part of this article was
published in Arash, No. 71, and July 1999.
3. For articles on this issue, see
Abdolreza Navvaah, "Daaneshjooyaan Saaketand," [Students are quiet]
Jame'eh Saalem, No. 30, Esfand, 1375/2-1997; Morad Saqafi, "Daaneshjoo,
Dolat, va Enqelaab" [The student, the state, and the revolution],
Goft-o-Gu, No. 5, Fall, 1373/1994; and "The Political Inclinations of the
Youth and the Students," Asr-e Ma, Vol. 2, No. 13, April 19, 1995.
4. R. Liyaqat, "Ela-le Bitavajohi-ye
Daaneshgaahiyaan be Masaael-e Siyaasi" [Causes of University Students'
Lack of Interest in Political Issues] Kalameh-ye Daaneshjoo, No. 8-9,
Khordad 1373/6-1994.
5. Abdolreza Navvaah, "Daaneshjooyaan
Saaketand," op. cit. Also, see Mohammad Malaki, "Barkhi Vaqaaye-e
Jonbesh-e Daaneshjoo-i" [Some Events within the Student Movement], Iran
Farda, No. 38, Aban and Azar, 1376/11-1997.
6. See Ervand Abrahamian, "The Guerrilla
Movement in Iran, 1963-1977."
MERIP Reports, No. 86, March-April 1980.
7. Morad Saqafi, "Demokraatizeh-shodane
Jonbesh-e Daaneshjoo-i" [The Democratization of the Student Movement],
Iran Farda, No. 38, Aban and Azar 1376/11-1997.
8. For a list of these protest rallies and
their causes see Kaavoshgar; Journal of Iranian University Professors in
Exile, No. 1, Spring 1987.
9. See reports of several cases in
Ettelaat, 3-5-1358/7-25-1979, 6-8-1358/10-28-1979, and
8-8-1358/10-30-1979.
10. For the history and activities of these
organizations see "Taarikhcheh-e Mobaarezaat-e Daaneshgaahiyaan-e Iran," [A History of
Struggles by the Iranian University Professors], Kaavoshgar, No. 1 (spring
1366/1987), No. 2 (winter 1366/1987), and No. 3 (spring 1368/1989).
11. Changiz Pahlevan, "Nezaame Ostaadi dar
daaneshgaah-haaye Iran" [Professorship
in the Iranian Universities], Goft-o-Gu, No. 5, fall, 1373/1994.
12. See Daaneshjooyaan Payro-e Khate Emaam,
Asnaad-e Laaneh-ye Jaasoosi [The Documents from the Nest of Spies (a
reference to the US Embassy in Tehran)], Tehran: Daftar-e Enteshaaraat-e
Eslaami, n.d.
13. Morad Saqafi believes that up until the
end of the war with Iraq, it was the
MSFIL who set the path for the formation of a revolutionary government.
After the war, the government could no longer follow the revolutionary
model proposed by the students. It had to separate its path from students
and isolate them from decision making. See Morad Saqafi, "Daaneshjoo,
Dolat, va Enqelaab," op. cit.
14. Ibid.
15. For a chronology of events, see three
issues of Kaavoshgar, op. cit.
16. Morad Saqafi, "Daneshjoo, Dolat, va
Enqelaab," op. cit.
17. See "Mas-aleh-ye Tahsilaate
Keshaavarzi-ye Zanaan"[The Problem of Agricultural Education for Women],
Daaneshgaah-e Enqelaab, No. 17, Aban 1361/11-1982. In 1372/1993, the
Ministry of Culture and Higher Education removed most of these
limitations.
18. "Payaame Saazemaane Mojaahedin-e
Enqelaab-e Eslaami-e Iran be Ejlaas-e Saraasari-ye Etehaadieh-haaye
Anjoman-haaye Eslaami-ye Daaneshjooyaan" [The Message of the Organization
of Mojaahedin of the Islamic Revolution to the National Meeting of the
Union of Islamic Student Associations], Asr-e Maa, No. 126, Mordad 27,
1378/8-18-1999.
19. Abdolkarim Soroush, "Taqlid va Tahqiq
dar Solook-e Daaneshjoo-i" [Investigation and Imitation in Student
Behavior], Kiyan, No. 1, Aban 1370/10-1991.
20. See Heshmatollah Tabarzadi,
"Naaqofteh-haaye Enqelaab: Raahe-halli baraaye Saakhtaare Siyaasi-ye
'Ayandeh-ye Iran [Untold Aspects of the Revolution: A Solution for Future
Political Structure of Iran], Hoviyate Khish, No. 3, Khordad 16,
1378/6-6-1999; "Emaam va Tahav-volaat-e Jonbeshe Daaneshjoo-i dar Vaapasin
Sal-haaye Daheh-ye Panjaah" [Imam and Developments in the Student Movement
in the Late 1350s] Asr-e Maa, Nos. 122 and 123, Tir 2 and 16,
1378/6-23-1999 and 7-7-1999; Abbas Abdi, "Khaateraate Abbas Abdi yeki az
Daaneshjooyaan-e Mosalmaane Payro-e Khate Emaam" [Memoirs of Abbas Abdi, a
Student Following Imam's Path], Kayhan Saal, 1365-66/1986-87.
21. Since 1376/1997 the DTV has been trying
to get a license for a student a ssociation called "The Center for Muslim
Students" in the Islamic Azaad universities. The university continues to
disqualify it for political reasons. See interview with Abdollah Jasebi in
Asr-e Azadegaan, No. 9, Mehr 25, 1378/10-17-1999.
22. See "Gofte-gu baa Daaneshjooyaan;
Bach-che-haaye Enqelaab Chegooneh Mi-andishand" [Interview with University
Students; What Children of the Revolution Think], Jame'eh Saalem, No. 23,
Azar, 1374/1995.
23. Hojat Mortaji, Jenaah-haaye Siyaasi dar
Iran-e Emrooz [Political Factions in Contemporary Iran], Tehran: Enteshaaraate Shafi-i,
1377/1998.
24. See "Paasokh-haaye Sarih va
Ekhtesaasi-ye Mohandes Tabarzadi be Khaanandegaan" [Direct and Exclusive
Answers to Readers' Questions by Engineer Tabarzadi], Hoviyat-e Khish, No.
3, Kordad 16 1378/6-16-1999.
25. Hojat Mortaji, op. cit.
26. See Majid Taval-laie, "Jonbeshe
Daaneshoui-ye Mostaqel" [The Independent Student Movement], Iran Farda,
No. 38, Aban and Azar, 1376/11-1997.
27. See Juergen Habermas, Toward a Rational
Society; Student Protest, Science, and Politics, Translated by Jeremy J.
Shapiro, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971;
Seymour Martin Lipset, Rebellion in the University, NJ: Transaction
Publications, 1993. In Persian, see Mohammad Hariri Akbari, Rishehaaye
Fa'aliyat-haaye Siyaasi-ye Daaneshjooyaan [Roots of Student Political
Activities], Iran: n.p.,
1351/1972.
28. A representative statement is
"Bayaaniyeh Anjoman-e Eslaami-ye Daaneshjoyaan-e Daaneshgaah-e Shahid
Beheshti" [The Statement by the Islamic Student Association of Shahid
Beheshti University], Salaam, Ordibehesht 31, 1370/5-21-1991.
29. A representative statement is
"Naameh-ye Anjoman-e Eslaami Daaneshjooyaan-e Daaneshgaah-e Shiraz va Olum-e Pezeshki-ye
Shiraz" [A Joint Letter by the
Islamic Student Associations of Shiraz University and the Medical Sciences
College of Shiraz], Salaam, Khordad 2, 1372/5-23-1993.
30. "The Militant Clergy Association and
the Concurrent Groups," Salaam, Tuesday, May 13, 1997. English translation
in NetIran.
31. Kaargozaaraan-e Saazandegi consists of
a moderate group of technocrats allied with Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. They
are known as "modern right" faction in the IRI.
32. "Paasokh-haaye Sarih va Ekhtesaasi-ye
Mohandes Tabarzadi be Khaanandegaan," op. cit.
33. The above numbers were reported by
Mohammad Soleimani, the deputy for Students Affairs at the Ministry of
Culture and Higher Education. See Iran News, 5-22-1995.
For an excellent analysis of the growth in the number of students in
Iranian universities, see Farzad Taheripour and Masoud Anjam-Sho 'a,
"Gostaresh-e 'Amoozesh-e 'Ali va Touse'eh-ye Jamiyat-e Daaneshjoo-i" [The
Expansion of Higher Education and the Growth of Student Population],
Barnaameh va Touse'eh, Vol. 2, No. 5, spring, 1372/1993.
34. According to Habibollah Ajayebi, Deputy
to Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, "based on the 1375/1996
statistics, there were 1,450,000 unemployed in Iran. It is estimated
that this number will double by the end of 1378 [3-2000]." Washington Iranians, September 10,
1999.
35. See "Daaneshjoo va Daaneshgaah;
Mohaafezeh-kaari va bi-omidi" [The Student and University; Conservatism
and Hoplessness], Gozaresh, No. 62, Farvardin, 1375/3-1996; "Faqat Es-man
Daaneshjoo Hastim!" [We Are Students Only in Name!], Gozaresh, No. 77,
Tir, 1376/7-1997; Interview with students, "Khordsaalaan-e Enqelaab
Chegooneh Mi-andishan," op. cit.; and "Javaanaan: Bozorgtar-haa Maa raa
Dark Nemikonand!" [The Youth: Our Adults Do Not Understand Us], Hamshahri,
Ordibehesht 21, 1376/5-11-1997.
36. See Mehrdad Mashayekhi, "Jonbesh-e
Daaneshjoo-i: yek Negaah-e Jaame' eshenaakhti" [The Student Movement: A
Sociological View], Keyhan (London), August 12,
1999.
37. The Iran Times, September 24,
1999.
38. Report by Neshat is reprinted in
Washington Iranians, Vol. 3, No. 71, Friday, August 27, 1999.
39. Salaam, Aban 9, 1377/10-31-1998.
40. Salaam, Aban 13, 1377/11-4-1998.
41. Salaam, Aban 14, 1377/11-5-1998.
42. Resaalat, Aban 20, 1377/11-11-1998.
43. Here by "the left opposition" I mean
Marxists, Socialists, and Social Democrats. They should not be confused
with "the religious left" within the ruling clerics.
44. See "Sarkoobe Shoresh-haa dar chand
shahre bozorg-e Iran" [The
Suppression of Uprisings in Several Big Cities], Arash, Khordad,
1371/6-1992.
45. For example, 10 days prior to the July
attack on the dormitory in Tehran University, 15 students in
the College of Agriculture in Karaj fell sick due to infected
waters in the university dormitory. See Hamshahri, Tir 7,
1378/6-28-1999.
46. Payaam Emrooz, No. 23, Ordibehesht,
1377/4-1998.
47. "Jonbeshe Daaneshjoo-i, ham 'Azaad, ham
Dolati" [The Student Movement, Both Independent and Official], Payaam
Emrooz, No. 31, Tir, 1378/7-22-1999.
48. For instance, the Islamic Student
Association in Sharif Industrial University was called to
the revolutionary court for writing a letter to the Leader of the IR
arguing against the authority of the Guardian Council to disqualify
candidates for elections [known as Approbatory Supervision]. See
Hamshahri, Tir 7, 1378/6-28-1999.
49. See the article by Alireza Alavitabar
in Sob-he Emrooz, Tir 31, 1378/7-22-1999.
50. See a letter by Ezatollah Sahabi,
Habibollah Payman, Ali Akbar Moinfar, and Ebrahim Yazdi, sent to the
President Khatami on Mordad 6, 1378/7-28-1999, published in Iran Farda,
No. 56, Mordad, 1378/7-1999, page 24.
51. See "Didgaah-haaye Azaaye Saazemaane
Mojaahedin-e Enqelaab-e Eslaami darbaareh-ye Masaael-e Jaari-ye Keshvar"
[Views of the Members of the Organization of Mojaahedin-e of the Islamic
Revolution about Current Affairs in the Country], Asr-e Maa, No. 125,
Mordad 13, 1378/8-4-1999.
52. These hints are listed and referred to
in an article by Hossein Bastani, "Senaar-you-ye Tashan-nojaate Akhir [The
Scenario for the Recent Unrest], Sob-he Emrooz, Tir 22, 1378/7-13-1999.
53. Elahe Sharifpour-Hicks, a lawyer and researcher for Human Rights Watch
talks about what she had learned of these plans in her article, "Iran's
Winter of Discontent," The Wall Street Journal, September 23, 1999.
54. See a report of these events in
Hamshahri, Tir 19, 1378/7-10-1999.
55. The number of individuals in plain
clothes, who participated in the raid, is not clear. Reported numbers are
between 50 to 400. The number quoted here was reported by Elahe
Sharifpour-Hicks in "Iran's Winter of
Discontent," op. cit.
56. Ibid.
57. See the section under "the third phase"
in the Report by the Investigative Committee of the Supreme National
Security Council distributed by IRNA and published in most newspapers in
Iran, including
Hamshahri, Mordad 24, 1378/8-15-1999.
58. "Behind the News," Iran Farda, No. 56,
Mordad 1378/8-1999, page 24.
59. See reports of the attacks in Neshat,
Khordad, Sob-he Emrooz, and Hamshahri on Tir 19-22, 1378
[7-10/7-13-1999].
60. Iran Daily, Tir 20,
1378/7-11-1999.
61. Hamshahri, Tir 19, 1378/7-10-1999.
62. Mohammad Qoochaani, "Barresi-ye
Enteqaadi-ye Harekate 18 Tir-e Daaneshjooyaan dar Tehran" [A Critical Look at the
18th Tir Movement by the Students], Neshat, Mordad 7, 1378/7-29-1999.
63. For the role of Lotfian in the
crackdowns, see the report in Neshat, Shahrivar 3, 1378/8-3-99.
64. I owe the analysis presented in this
paragraph to a presentation by Masoud Razavi, of Hamshahri, in Paris, September 1999.
65. Farshid Motahari, "Student Unrest in
Teheran Turns into Victory for Reformist President," Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, July 11, 1999.
66. Rezaie's remarks were published in
Sob-he Emrooz, Khordad 20, 1378/6-10-1999.
67. For positive reports on this
demonstration see Keyhan, Resaalat, Jomhori Eslaami, and Abrar. Reports of
beatings and arrests of students and Khatami supporters can be found in
Neshat, Sob-he Emrooz, Khordad, Hamshahri, and Iran, Tir 24,
1378/7-14-1999.
68. "Tahav-volaate Jaariye Keshvar: dar
Jostejooye Esteraateji va Taaktic," [Current Developments in the Country:
In Search of a Strategy and Tactic] Ya Lessarsat al-Hossein, Mordad,
1378/8-1999.
69. See Jomhuri Islami, Mordad 14,
1378/8-5-1999.
70. Hamshahri, Mordad 24,
1378/8-15-1999.
71. See Reza Alijani, "Gaame Ba'di-ye
Paygiri-haa baa Kist?" [Who is Going to Follow the Matter Now?], Iran
Farda, No. 56, Mordad 1378/8-1999]. See also "Negaahi Vizheh be
Gozaaresh-e Komiteh-ye Tahqiq-e Shoraaye 'Ali-ye Amniyat darbaareh-ye
Faaje'eh-ye Kouye Daaneshgaah" [A Special Look at the Report by the
Investigative Committee of the SNSC about the Campus Tragedy], Asr-e Maa,
No. 127, Shahrivar 10, 1378/9-1-1999.
72. AFP News, July 20, 1999.
73. Khordad, Mordad 3, 1378/7-25-1999.
74. See his interview in Khordad, Mordad 6,
1378/7-28-1999. See also Mohammad Reza Sardari, "Senaaryou-i keh Natijehye
Makoos daad," [A Scenario that Produced the Unwanted Result], Neshat,
Mordad 2, 1378/7-24-1999.
75. See interview with Ayatollah Khazali in
Sob-he Emrooz, Tir 31, 1378/7-22-1999.
76. See his comments in Sob-he Emrooz, Tir
31, 1378/7-22-1999. See also comments by Habibollah Asgaroladi, the
General Secretary of the JME, in Neshat, Mordad 25, 1378/8-16-1999.
77. For Dehnamaki's comments see his
interviews in Sob-he Emrooz (Tir 20, 1378/7-11-1999), Neshat (Mordad 21,
1378/8-12-1999), and "Havaades-e Kouye Daaneshgah va Naqshe Ansaar; dar
Goftegou baa Masoud Dehnamaki" [The Events in University Dormitories and
the Role of the Ansaar; An Interview with Masoud Dehnamaki], Tavaana, No.
46, Mordad 4, 1378/7-26-1999.
78. Sermon by Ayatollah Janati on Mordad
29/ 8-20-1378, The Iran Times, August 27,
1999.
79. See Rahbarpour's interview in Jomhori
Eslami, Shahrivar 2, 1378 [8-24-1999].
80. Sob-he Emrooz, Mehr 29,
1378/10-21-1999.
81. "Zafe Bozorge Jonbesh dar Bisaazmaani
Ast" [The Biggest Weakness of the Movement is its Lack of Organization],
Raah-e Toudeh, excerpts quoted in the Iran Times, October 1,
1999.
82. "Didgaah-haaye Azaaye Saazemaane
Mojaahedin-e Enqelaab-e Eslaami darbaareh-ye Masaa'el-e Jaari-ye Keshvar,"
op. cit.
83. See various statements made by
intellectuals like Parviz Piran, Mosa Ghaninejad, Alireza Alavitabar, and
Fariborz Raisdana (Sob-he Emrooz, Tir 22, 1378/7-13-1999), Masoud Behnood,
and Ezatollah Sahabi (Neshat, Tir 21, 1378/7-12-1999). A statement by 111
national-religious activists critical of the conservative forces urged
students to "avoid emotional behaviors and extremist slogans." (See
Khordad, Tir 22, 1378/7-13-1999).
84. News, Reuters, July 14,
1999.
85. A list of these slogans is published in
Washington Iranians, Vol. 3, No. 68, Friday, July 16, 1999. [Editor's
Note: See also Bina's article in this issue.]
86. Ghay-r Khodi is an expression often
used by the conservative faction describing those who do not share their
views and are against a theocracy in Iran.
87. See comments made by Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani and a host of Friday prayers around the country on Friday Tir
25, 1378/7-16-1999. A sample of them can be found in Khordad, Murdered 3,
1378/7-25-1999. See also comments by four members of the Majles in this
regard in Iran, Mordad 14,
1378/8-5-1999.
88. For an analysis of conservative
approach to the "third current," see Hassan Yousefi Ashkevari,
"'Jariyaan-e Sev-voum' hamaan 'Jariyaan-e Dov-voum ' Ast" [The Third
Current is the Same as the Second Current], Asr-e Azaadegaan, No. 9, Mehr
25, 1378/10-17-1999.
89. See the article by Majid Haji Babaie,
"Omq-e Goftemaan, Niyaaze Jonbesh-e Daaneshjoo-i" [The Need for a Profound
Discourse in the Student Movement], Khordad, Mehr 12, 1378/10-4-1999.
90. See interview with Hojatoleslam Qumi,
chief of the Organization Representing His Excellency the Leader in
Universities, Sob-he Emrooz, Tir 12, 1378/7-3-1999; Interview with
Abdollah Nouri, when he was still an Interior Minister, Salaam and
Hamshahri, March 5, 1998; Leader's comments to personal representatives at
the colleges and universities, Iran News, 12-5-1996; Statement by
Rafsanjani's Minister of Culture and Higher Education during his second
term as president, Mohammad Reza Hashemi Golpaygani, Iran News,
13-8-1994.
91. See his remarks in Gozaresh, No. 77, Tir
1376/7-1997, page 6.