Q. Over the past five
decades, all the broad political movements in Iran have been religious in nature.
It seems that the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s movement, which is
seen as a turning point among these political-religious
movements, transformed the conditions of political struggle in
Iran and brought political Islam onto the scene as the superior
ideology—as against left-wing and nationalist ideologies.
During the reformist period
and exactly at a time when many observers and analysts imagined
that the Islamic Revolution was finished and that political
Islam, too, had reached a dead-end and lost its capabilities,
the political ideas of Muslim thinkers once again turned into
the axis around which theoretical and social debates revolved,
generating a huge volume of ideas and reflections on religious
and political issues.
In the events since the
June 2009 presidential election and in the course of the Green
protest movement, too, we’ve seen the pervasive hold that
religious ideas and symbols—and, especially, religious
intellectuals’ reading of Islam—have had in the realm of
political activity. We can see this everywhere, whether among
the movement’s political leaders, the political prisoners, or
the movement’s key slogans and symbols.
Now, based on these
assumptions, the question that arises is this: As one of the
most prominent contemporary advocates of new religious thinking,
how do you see this movement’s short-, medium- and long-term
prospects? And what role do you think religious intellectuals
have in leading this movement and proposing political and social
guidelines and programmes?
A. It’s really not easy for
me to make long-term predictions. But I can say that, in the
long-term, the ideas of the Green Movement will become more
entrenched, will rob more hearts and will produce great effects
in Iran. It will subject the idea of
political Islam to a more critical assessment and delineate
religion’s role in society in a clearer way.
At present, I believe that
the Green Movement has many undeniable achievements to its
credit. I’m living outside Iran
and, in addition to the news that I hear from Iran itself, I see many young people
who have become attached to this movement and who are active
without anyone prompting them. And I really see something in
this movement that has robbed young people’s hearts. And this
something consists of ‘right’ and ‘freedom’. I can see the
selflessness with which young people are working around this
axis, and the way in which they’re giving their time, energy and
even money to keep this lamp alight. This is why I’m of the view
that the Green Movement has a great achievement to its credit so
far and it will undoubtedly play a role in the future too
because these cries are emanating from the heart of society.
Q. In your view, how
influential a role do religious intellectuals and Muslim
thinkers have in this process?
A. If it’s not boasting, I
have to say that I gave two talks in London ten years ago under the heading “The
Discourses of the Islamic Revolution”. I said there that we have
had a red discourse and that we will have a green discourse too.
And I’m glad that I associated the expression ‘green discourse’
with attributes such as democracy, pluralism, civil society,
respect for rights and the like. We can see all of these things
clearly in the Green Movement. And, of course, this is not by
any means to say that this has been the work of a single
individual; many people have worked to this end and their views
and works have been noted and recognized, and they have borne
fruit.
As I said, the Green
Movement has two major axes: respect for rights and rejection of
despotism. Today, we can see that the rejection of religious
despotism is the point around which people’s slogans revolve.
This is very timely and appropriate. Religious intellectuals had
underlined this point more than anything else and it has become
clear now that their message was emphatically noted and
received.
Both before and after the
revolution, the late Mehdi Bazargan always used to say that this
country and this society’s eternal ailment is ‘despotism’. He
even attached more importance to despotism than colonialism.
Fortunately, after the revolution, the country achieved
independence to a great extent. So, despotism has become more
important and more noticeable. And the Green Movement wants to
rid the country of despotism, root and branch, regardless of the
name it operates under. And, fortunately, forward-looking Muslim
thinkers and intellectuals have played a big role in all this.
Q. Do you think that—as
some people believe and suggest—this movement is a transitional
stage from religious reformism to a complete break with the
religious system, in such a way as to sideline the ideas and
actions of religious forces and push them away from the
centre-stage of society and political struggle?
A. I think we’re heading
towards a rejection of the despotic reading of religion. And
this is a very auspicious direction to take. It has now become
an accepted notion among Iranians that there can be different
readings of religion. The current, ruling reading is the
despotic reading of religion, but this is not to say that if we
do away with religious tyranny, no reading of religion will
remain; on the contrary, we can have a democratic reading of
religion. And in this respect, the green discourse is very rich
and fertile. That is to say, the notions of pluralism, rights,
freedom and justice, which are the Green Movement’s top
priorities, all show that a different reading of religion is
being taken on board and that the despotic reading is being
driven to the periphery.
The theory of the
velayat-e faqih [underpinning the Islamic Republic of Iran’s
system of rule by a cleric] is recognized to be the despotic
reading of religion. So, there will be no place for it in the
future state. But the idea that the people are turning away from
religion and want to divest themselves of their beliefs—I don’t
think this is the case and there’s no evidence for it.
But, at present, the ruling
reading of Islam has two defining features: first, it is
despotic and, secondly, it is riddled with superstition. By
combating superstition and despotism, we will move towards ‘a
green reading’ of Islam, which will not have these two defining
features; instead, they will be replaced with justice, freedom
and an orientation towards rights.
Q. In the years after the
1979 revolution and especially over the past two decades, Muslim
intellectuals, including you, have done a great deal of academic
and theoretical work to establish the terrain and the boundaries
of religion and politics—or, more precisely, religion and
political power; so much so that the speakers and the media that
support the state or are supported by the state have accused
them of overstepping religion. What’s your assessment of the
role that this group of religious thinkers—compared to
non-religious thinkers—has to play in clarifying the
relationship between religion and power and other related
notions?
A. Both religious and
non-religious intellectuals have served the country. I believe
that religious intellectuals have taken on a more grave and more
difficult mission, because, in a religious society, it is more
difficult to speak about religion; especially if there are
official guardians and interpreters of religion. You have to pay
a big price for every step you take. Fortunately, religious
modernizers and intellectuals have made good progress in this
endeavour. Work on a new delineation of the boundary between
religion and politics has been under way for some time now. One
of the important causes of this was the new role that religion
took on in society when it took up the seat of power and began
interfering in people’s personal affairs from that position,
which aroused many protests. By bringing fiqh
centre-stage, as a finished, celestial given that cannot be
subjected to ijtihad [reasoned formulation of new rulings
based on the circumstances of time and place], and by
implementing the rulings of fiqh in a partisan and
occasionally arbitrary and selective way, the power holders both
brought Iran into disrepute internationally and stirred up
discontent within the country.
In the light of all this,
religious intellectuals, who—unlike non-religious
intellectuals—truly care about religion, have been faced with
much graver responsibilities. On the one hand, they have to
reject and proscribe the inappropriate behaviour of the state,
and, on the other hand, they have to wrest religion out of the
clutches of these incompetent officials whilst, at the same
time, ensuring that it was not harmed in the process. They have
to convince religious people that their religiosity is still
worthy of adoration and that it can bring them felicity in this
world and the next.
A line was therefore drawn
between religion and power. This delineation means that, in
keeping with their religious duties, religious people can take
part in power and politics, but they cannot commit acts of
violence in the name of religion or use it as a pretext to
exercise intolerance. They cannot view anyone who belongs to
another religious creed as deserving of unequal rights. They
cannot claim exclusive rights in the name of religion or claim
that religion has only one single interpretation, which is the
official one. These are all things that nowadays fall under the
banner of political secularism.
I believe that, in our
society, among religious modernizers and intellectuals, and
among most educated people, it is now an accepted notion that
secularism is the most sanitary mode for the state and for the
relationship between religion and power. And, of course, it is
very different from philosophical secularism and it is
absolutely distinct from unbelief or irreligiosity.
Some newspapers in
Iran
deliberately confuse political secularism with philosophical
secularism in order to make people despise secularism. But,
based on the above explanation and based on the clarification of
the relationship between power and religion, political
secularism will herald a brighter future for both power and
religion.
Q. In view of the fact that
discussion, dialogue and even criticism help clear the air, what
subjects and issues do you think need to be discussed, as a
matter of priority, by Muslim thinkers—whether traditionalists
or modernists—on the one hand, and by religious and
non-religious thinkers, on the other hand. What chapter headings
would you propose for such rational discussions?
A. Criticism and peer
reviews are a sign of a society’s maturity. Many philosophers
argue that criticism is a second-order activity. In other words,
once you can step beyond a first-order perspective and achieve
self-awareness, then you can criticize (repentance is an example
of this). And this is a sign of maturity.
In a religious society,
criticism of religion is of the utmost importance. This must be
done from the perspective of morality. Hence, morality must be
given pride of place. What we lack today is a moral perspective
of religion and a moral perspective of politics. We must breathe
new life into both these things. Hence, in my view, we must,
first, bring morality centre-stage and, then, discuss the topics
of a moral religion and a moral politics. These are priority
issues.
Q. Setting aside your
theoretical views, given Iranian society’s current
circumstances, would you consider it better and more realistic
to seek to reform Iran’s current
political system by forcing the rulers to accept the people’s
sovereignty and to abide by the law, or to strive to change the
constitution and even to change the political system? In other
words, which of the following two slogans do you prefer:
‘independence, freedom, Islamic republic’ or ‘independence,
freedom, Iranian republic’?
A. Let me say briefly that
names are not particularly important; the important thing is
what the names point to. Regardless of what we call it, we want
a state that is rights-oriented and respects people’s rights; a
state that does not see religion or anything else as a barrier
to respecting people’s rights.
I think that the idea of
respect for rights must be given pride of place in the
constitution; in other words, it must be given the position that
the velayat-e faqih enjoys in the current constitution.
And anything that violates this rights-orientation must be
discarded. This is the kind of thing we want to see in the
future and we hope that it will be achieved.
Q. Specifically, do you
think that an Islamic republic minus the velayat-e faqih
is conceivable (in theory and in practice)? Or does an Islamic
republic hinge on the theory of the velayat-e faqih and
the position of the ruling cleric?
A. We can conceive of an
Islamic republic that is ‘a republic of Muslims’.
And a republic
of
Muslims can exist without
it hinging on the theory of the velayat-e faqih and
without it being governed by many of the other ideas that emerge
from a fiqh that has not been subjected to ijtihad.
But if it’s going to be called ‘a republic of Muslims’, it’s best just to speak of an
unqualified republic.
Translated from the
Persian by Nilou Mobasser