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Part I of discussion between Hojjat ol‑Eslam Mohsen Kadivar and Dr. Abdolkarim Soroush

{The question of pluralism is one of the discussions that

has found its way in recent years into religious studies fields in our

country and has recently prompted various arguments. SALAM newspaper, in

connection with expanding the foundations of Islamic thought and ideas, has

engaged in clarifying this theory and in this connection invited Dr.

Sorush, as the person who has raised this question, and Hojjat ol‑Eslam

Kadivar, as one of the thinkers of the seminary, to engage in discussions

and dialogue in this connection. What follows is the result of this

conversation. SALAM hopes that removed from futile commotions that some

create in the area of ideas, it will be able to create a suitable and clear

arena to express new ideas in the area of religious studies. We hope that

experts will help us continue this discussion by sending us their

criticisms and views. Also, we would like to point out that the publication

of this material in no way reflects the views of the newspaper in this

regard.}

Part 1

Hojjat ol‑Eslam Kadivar

In the name of God the compassionate and the merciful, and with His

help. One of the important issues of our age is the manner of confronting

the variety and plurality of the religions that exist in the world. We have

numerous wars, both religious and nonreligious.

The existing religions are comprised of two groups, revealed and

non‑revealed religions. In each of the revealed religions, we have numerous

sects, as well. The question that is raised for every thinker is how to

interpret the variety and number of religious and nonreligious opinions, on

the one hand, and the number, plurality, and variety of various religions,

on the other, as well as the variety of sects in every religion. Certainly,

the variety and plurality of religions and sects as well as doctrines is an

"external reality." But, whether or not this reality also has any "truth"

in it is an issue that has occupied the minds of thinkers for quite some

time.

In this area, numerous interpretations have been offered. The question

of "religious pluralism" is a particular interpretation of the existing

plurality in religious opinions. This interpretation is not the only

interpretation of the plurality and variety of religions. Other

interpretations can also be mentioned.

First interpretation: Some religious believers consider only their own

way the exclusive way for human guidance. They do not consider other ways

proper or as the ideal.

Second interpretation: Some others, even though they consider their

own way to be the way to reach the ideal, do not reject all other religions

and paths.

They establish a relationship between other religions and their own

and somehow are "inclusive" in their own religious beliefs in regards to

other religions and sects, in the sense that every religion, sect, or

doctrine has some truth, is not absolutely false, and is rewarding in

proportion to how much truth it has, but complete truth is only found in

one religion.

Third interpretation: One group regards this "actual plurality" as

"true plurality" and have tried somehow to speak of different and authentic

experiences of religion, and even in numerous sacred affairs to speak of

direct paths and not a direct path, numerous truths and not a single truth.

This interpretation constitutes religious pluralism. Considering that the

question of religious pluralism itself has different and numerous

interpretations, undoubtedly, starting the discussion in this area is an

auspicious beginning for the blossoming of religious studies in our

society. The main preoccupation of religious believers has always been

whether various understandings on the question of the plurality of

religions will harm the question of religious faith and belief, or can one

have religious belief and at the same time find some truth in a religion

other than one"s own. In other words, is religious pluralism

compatible with religious faith and belief and, in a word, with belief in

religion? The discussion that we want to have today, with the help of God,

is an examination and critique of various interpretations that have been

offered in regards to the plurality of religions. One of these

interpretations is the theory of pluralism which Dr. Sorush has discussed

recently, and which has raised serious questions. First, we will hear a

summation of this discussion from his own lips, and then we will discuss

other interpretations of the plurality of religions and sects, especially

from the viewpoint of religious pluralism and particularly from the

perspective of its compatibility or incompatibility with religious belief.

Dr. "Abdolkarim Sorush

In the name of God the compassionate and the merciful. I am grateful

to Mr. Kadivar for starting the discussion. I will also give a brief

explanation about the issue, and then we will have a discussion. The

question of pluralism is a search to explain the actual existing plurality

in the world and, for that matter, the inevitable, distinct, and sometimes

contradictory plurality. We live in a world in which we face numerous

pluralities, whether plurality in religion, plurality in languages,

plurality in cultures, plurality in skins, plurality in color, or plurality

in race, and the like. Hence, the external world is a world of plurality.

For every thinker, it is problematic how to explain the existence and birth

of these varieties and pluralities. In other words, it is a question of

why: Why are humans not of the same color and race in the world? Why do we

not have a single religion? Why do all the people not have the same tastes

and think alike? And so on.

As soon as we see ourselves confronted with the question of plurality,

explaining it becomes important to us. For us religious people, explaining

the plurality of religions is doubly important, because every religious

person believes in his own religion and regards other religions, compared

to his own, which he considers right, not to be right. This is different

from the plurality of languages and colors, in which there is no discussion

about right and wrong.

Now, in order to explain the plurality of religions, we must clarify

our opinion regarding several issues. But from the very start, I would say

that the question of religious pluralism, or the question of explaining the

plurality of religions, is primarily and by nature not an issue of deciding

about right and wrong. It is not a religious jurisprudential or theological

question. In other words, it is neither to determine the religious duty of

religious people, nor to discuss determining and proving the truth of one

religion among others. It is not even to recommend tolerance. But,

primarily and by nature, it is for the philosophical, epistemological

explanation that has appeared in the arena of religion at the present and

appears to be inevitable. In other words, despite the arguments that

various theologians from various religions have had with one another, this

plurality has not been eliminated and appears to be inevitable, and every

group of religious people continues to believe in its own sect and

doctrine. Also, religious pluralism does not begin from the premise that

all religions are right or equal, and it does not predetermine the truth or

falsehood of any one of them. Now, to explain the plurality of religions,

immediately we find ourselves faced with several problems. One is the

question of divine guidance. Philosophically, we must clarify our opinion

about divine guidance and determine in what sense we regard God to be a

guide. As pointed out in the article, "The Direct Paths," when we see

ourselves faced with poverty and injustice in the real world, we must

clarify our opinion in regards to divine mercy and providence. Without

coming to a clear opinion, we cannot succeed in solving the question of

evil in the world. The same is true of the question of divine guidance and

combining it with the misguidance of a large number of human beings.

A second point that we must face in explaining plurality is the

question of human intellect. We must also have a clear opinion in regards

to what the extension of our understanding is and how trustworthy it is,

because one can easily say, only we are right and all the people in the

world are misguided. This can easily be said, and perhaps the followers of

every sect have the same opinion. But it does not end here, because

immediately, we face the question of: How is it that the majority of the

people of the world are wrong, do not know that they are misguided, and

consider themselves the vehicle of truth? What is the difference between

our intellect and that of others, that we are not mistaken and have found

the truth? Have all the people been deceived? Are all the people blind

imitators? Do all disregard the rules of truth and falsehood, reason and

proof? Are all selfish? Are all deceived by Satan, except for us? In any

case, any one of these explanations would immediately confront us with the

issue that, until we have a [illegible] of the intellect of human beings,

we cannot especially solve the problem of religious pluralism, because the

fact is that each of the existing sects and religions in the world that

consider themselves to be right necessarily say that the majority of the

people of the world are misguided. In other words, if you look at

Christianity and think that, nominally, there are about 1 billion followers

of Christianity in the world, still there are four to five times as many

who do not follow Christianity. Take the Shi"ites, the Zeydis, the

Ismailis, the Jews. No matter what group you take that believe in their

truth, the conclusion is that the majority of the people of the world are

misguided, are not prepared to give up their wrong ways, and continue to

believe in their own path. Hence, we must make it clear what has happened

to people"s intellect and the purpose of divine guidance. The

implication that has been offered so far is that they have said that,

firstly, this plurality will return to unity. Hence, the plurality has been

denied. This is ignoring the issue.

The discussion on pluralism begins with accepting and proving

plurality. If someone believes that these pluralities, as the mystics say,

are an illusion, are arbitrary, and are not true, that they are false

pluralities and underneath them is a unity, in that case, the question of

pluralism is put aside and is beyond discussion. But, if we assume a

plurality that is explainable by nature, in that case, pluralism is an

issue. Secondly, it has been said that there are common aspects of

religions. But it must be noted that the question of pluralism is about the

differences and not what they have in common. The parts that they have in

common will be outside the explanation and do not need it. Thirdly, it has

been said that, in the world of religions, we can offer several theories of

why different groups have been misguided. One is resorting to the

conspiracy theory. Another is fighting the truth. Another is

misunderstanding, another imitation, another the complexity of the truth,

and others that have been mentioned in the article on "The Direct Paths."

Apparently, we have no other solution. We must either say, for example,

that the Sunnis who did not become Shi"ites did not because of a

conspiracy in the history of Islam, and they all became Sunnis. Or we must

say that no conspiracy took place, but some misunderstood Islam, contrary

to us; we understood it correctly. Or we might say that they did not

misunderstand it, neither did a conspiracy occur, but they were hostile

and, because of selfishness and their interests, they trampled the truth.

Or we might say that the truth was so complex that few could understand it,

hence, they are not guilty. No matter which of these theories we mention

with regard to the variety of sects and religions, immediately we find

ourselves faced with this important supposition, that either the majority

of the people of the world are hostile to the truth, or have misunderstood,

or are intellectually weak, or have been deceived by conspiracy. In all

these cases, we are fighting the people"s intellect as well as divine

guidance. Of course, we should remember that every theory that we offer in

regards to intellect also includes ourselves. In my opinion, the correct

way to pose the question is that, if we do not want to say so, we should

find a way that would interpret both variety and human intellect, give a

clear place to divine guidance, and also contain truth and justice.

[Kadivar] I will begin with a discussion from within religion, and in

continuation, I will look at the issue from outside religion. Hence, I will

explain the understanding in Shi"ite Islam of the question of

plurality and variety of religions, sects, and doctrines in theological

terms.

First point: There is no doubt about the fact that there is actual

plurality in the world, especially plurality of religions. No one can deny

the plurality of religions as an external reality. In fact, the question is

how to explain this plurality. Why are there many religions, and now, if

there are, how should we approach this plurality? At the start of the

discussion, I find it necessary to separate the issue of "tolerance" from

the way we enter into and exit the issue of "religious pluralism." One can

believe in the exclusivity of legitimacy in one religion or accept other

theories, such as the "inclusiveness of the true religion" compared to

other religions, or the idea of numerous true religious (that is, direct

paths), while in practice, and in social attitude, believe in "tolerance."

Hence, these two issues must be separated. The question of pluralism,

exclusivity, non‑exclusivity, or any other theory that is discussed in

connection with explaining the plurality of religions can be combined with

the question of tolerance in the sense that, in our behavior, we believe in

peaceful coexistence with all religions and take certain rights into

consideration for the followers of different religions. We assume this

issue to be settled. In other words, various religions (or at least some of

the religions, as it is in our religion) have certain rights that have been

officially recognized. But our discussion is not about the social conduct

of the believers in one religion or the followers of other religions. In

fact, the discussion is about whether we exclusively have the truth and

others do not have it at all, or whether it is otherwise.

Second point: The issue can also be explained in another way. That is,

we believe that God has sent two types of messengers to guide human beings,

one messenger is the intellect of human beings, which He has granted as a

gift in all humans, and another consists of the external messengers, who

are the prophets sent by God. This internal messenger, that is, the

God‑given intellect or the God‑seeking nature of man, exists in all people

to varying degrees. No man lacks [the instinct to] seek the truth and

longing for God. All humans have such a pure instinct in them and, hence,

seek the truth. They may have differences ways of finding the manifestation

of truth, as they do, but it cannot be doubted that all seek the truth,

even supreme truth. On the other hand, God has not considered this

messenger, that is, the messenger of wisdom, the internal messenger, to be

enough and has been generous to humanity in sending external messengers

accordingly to guide the people. Various nations have witnessed the

appointment of prophets who have all provided the people with divine

teachings. Hence, it is meant that God has sent different prophets who have

started different religions. Among the revealed religions, this variety is

accepted in this sense. In other words, numerous religions consider

themselves to be related to God, and that numerous prophets, such as

Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Mohammad, have come to call the people to

salvation and perfection. There is no doubt that each of these divine

religions was in fact "true" in its own time and was most true for humans

to be able to understand and approach it. For example, Christianity during

the time when Jesus came to guide the people had the greatest part of the

truth (which humans could understand at that time). The same was true

during the time of Moses and other prophets. Hence, every prophet who came,

in fact, came from a single God with specific teachings. These teachings

are no different in nature from the teachings of the past prophets. They do

not have marked differences. They do not have inevitable pluralism,

contrary to the fact that in religious pluralism, it is said that those

marked differences are inevitable and natural. On the contrary, the

teachings of the revealed prophets (prophets who have come from God)

indicate a single truth. If there are differences seen in the teachings of

these religions, at least in the form in which they came (prior to being

distorted), they represent the various degrees of truth. In other words,

the single truth, which is sacred, which is God, reduces this truth to a

degree from the divine memory and places it at the disposal of the human

beings of each era. Undoubtedly, it is different from the degree of truth

that He provided man at the time of Jesus or at the time of the Prophet of

Islam. But these differences are dubious differences and not marked

differences by nature. What is meant by dubious differences is that the

final position of the revealed religion includes all the perfection of the

previous religions. Everything good that was in Judaism, Christianity, or

Abrahamic religions, Islam claims to contain. In addition to the past

perfection, it also has perfection that is not witnessed in the past

religions. The reason for this difference is explainable and clarifiable.

Based on the same religious instructions, appropriate to human development,

God decided to provide people with more of the truth. This truth is

expressed in the form of religious teachings, in the form of verses in the

divine book, or in the form of reliable reported sayings from the mouths of

the infallible and placed at the disposal of mankind and religious people.

Hence, there is no marked difference and inevitable plurality among the

divine religions, even though there is variety.

Third point: Also, among divine religions, with every religion that

comes, the latest religion revokes some of the religious rulings of the

previous one or completes them. But in regards to beliefs and morality, all

religions verify and complement one another, and none of them is considered

a revocation of another in terms of belief. If there is any revocation, it

is only in the area of religious jurisprudential rulings and religious

laws, proportionate to the level of perfection in various societies and

times, and not in the area of religious beliefs. This unity of many of the

beliefs of the divine religions is again another example of lack of

differences in nature and the incorrectness of inevitable plurality.

Islamic beliefs verify and complete the true Christian beliefs, the

same beliefs that Christianity had when the Bible was inspired, the same

beliefs that existed in Judaism, before distortion occurred in it. In fact,

these beliefs complete one another, and in this regard, there is no

difference between them. All these religions speak of a single God and

speak about the day of judgment and resurrection. They speak of the

necessity of guidance by prophets for man"s salvation, and all are

unanimous that certain laws should be expressed by the prophets to guide

man.

Fourth point: The result that we can get from divine religion is that,

if we look at the plurality of divine religions, this plurality can be

explained in this way, that the final religion, Islam (at least, as claimed

by Muslims), includes all the perfection of the previous religions. The

truth of Islam does not mean the absolute falsehood of Judaism and

Christianity. It does not mean that the Jews and Christians who lived

before Islam and followed their own religious rules were wrong and false.

No. They were also guided. Even today, if someone is a Jew or a Christian,

we do not say that he is absolutely wrong, in the sense that, after all, he

is a monotheist and believes in the day of judgment. He performs good deeds

in accordance with his religious laws. And supposing that he is not among

the scholars of Christianity and has, for instance, not heard the message

of Islam and believes in the teachings of his own religion and performs the

laws of his religion, he may have salvation in the next world. Hence, if we

speak about the truth of Islam, it is dubious truth, in the sense that

Islam has the previous truths in its teachings. It never means that if

someone is not of our religion and does not call himself a Muslim, he is

certainly misguided. We do not make such a claim. Here, we are separating

the scholars and ordinary people. This is the issue that in our religious

culture is interpreted in some respect as the issue of "the inculpable

ignorant and the culpable ignorant."

In fact, what in Islam is value and the truth that stems from it is

true faith in God and the day of judgment and pious deeds. In our ideology,

titles and names are never of true value. Of course, it is clear that

complete salvation and reward belongs to one who believes in the

prophethood of the Seal of the Prophets and practices his instructions.

Hence, the discussion in the first part (among revealed religions) can be

summed up as follows: that we can both believe in one supreme truth and

also not consider other religions and followers of other religions as

completely false.

Fifth point: Another point is raised here about the followers of

non‑revealed and non‑divine religions. For example, the Buddhists and the

followers of Confucius and the like are not followers of divine religions,

from our perspective. But, considering the internal messenger to what I

referred to in the beginning of the discussion, if we assume that these

religions are human efforts to achieve the sacred and the supreme, we can

find in them some truth. Hence, if we consider Islam as absolute truth,

even the non‑divine religions are absolute falsehood. To the extent that

their direction is towards the sacred and the supreme, they may have

achieved some truth. In the same way that moral principles are not all

acquired by grace and worship, many of these principles are rational, there

is no problem with a follower of one of the non‑divine religions having

reached some of these moral principles with his own intellect, for

instance, considering lying as prohibited in his own religion, condemning

theft, respecting truthfulness, honor and self‑sacrifice, and the like. He

can also believe in a sacred concept. Hence, every religion, in proportion

to the truth that it contains, is worthy of respect.

A Buddhist and an apostate without religion are different. He is

preferable to [the apostate] who denies the sacred and oppresses the

metaphysical. Every religious person is respectable to the degree of truth

he has in his religion. Certainly, if someone believes in Islam, if he

considers his religion right, it does not mean that anyone who does not

have his beliefs is absolutely false. Rather, he believes that the various

truths are found in his own religion in their perfected and completed form.

Sixth point: The next stage of the discussions is about various sects.

We see that there are various sects in every religion. In Islam, we have

Shi"ites and Sunnis. Among the Sunnis, there are various sects.

Various sects have also appeared among the Shi"ites. Still, the same

question is raised. In our belief, we do not say that if someone is not a

Shi"ite, he is completely wrong. Rather, we believe that truth is also

found in his religion and beliefs. In religious rules, he has many common

points with Shi"ism. In terms of religious discussion, as a believer

in one of the Islamic sects, we say that this interpretation, that is, the

interpretation of the Prophet"s family of Islam, in our opinion, is

true.

If we say that Shi"ism is right, we do not mean that the

teachings of the Sunnis are all false, and anyone who does not believe as

we do will have no benefit from guidance. This interpretation has some

supporters, but what I am defending here is that heaven and hell are not

granted for a price, but as a justification. Faith and pious deeds bring

salvation and not names and titles. Every Muslim who has this belief and

engages in good deeds will benefit according to the level of those beliefs

and good deeds. Of course, we believe that the most perfect beliefs are in

the interpretations of the teachings of the Prophet"s family, both in

the area of beliefs and in the area of practice. But, again I emphasize

that, if we say truth is in Shi"ism, it is not meant that Sunnis are

all wrong. Rather, some of the truth, that is, Islam, is also found among

the Sunnis. Hence, we defend the fact that other Islamic sects also have

some of the truth, and as to whom God takes to heaven, God only knows. We

certainly know that the requirement for going to paradise is faith and good

deeds. This faith and good deeds has a perfect form and also more imperfect

forms.

Since I consider the main problem of religious pluralism its

compatibility or incompatibility with faith and religious belief, I have

found it necessary, before giving an explanation from outside religion, to

present the religious (inside religion) understanding of the question of

plurality of religions, sects, and doctrines and emphasize that, by

accepting, firstly, the existence of a single supreme truth, secondly,

accepting the possibility of understanding the truth to the level of human

intellect, and, thirdly, accepting a specific level and standard of truth

for separating the truth from falsehood, one can believe that a religion

and a sect have more of the truth and other religions and sects have

salvation based on the level of this truth and not necessarily closeness to

the religion of truth. Also, the principles of our religion have a

determining effect on our extra‑religions discussion.

Subslug: Part II of discussion between Hojjat ol‑Eslam Mohsen Kadivar and Dr.

"Abdolkarim Sorush

Dr. Sorush

Mr. Kadivar took the discussion inside religion and spoke of truth and

falsehood. He expressed the beliefs of a pure Shi"ite that

Shi"ism is pure and absolute truth, and others have some truth at the

level of their proximity to Shi"ism. A Shi"ite goes to heaven and

others, if they do not know about Shi"ite beliefs, are the inculpable

ignorant, and that God will treat them with kindness and mercy. Such an

entry into the question of pluralism is to remove its foundation and

meaning. It is a statement that I would also hear if I were speaking with a

Wahabi, a Christian, or a Zoroastrian. It is astonishing that he says that

religions are not markedly different in nature, however, not religions in

their present form, but undistorted religions. In other words, again, it is

settling for the same positions within one"s own religion. Another way

to look at the issue is from the extra‑religions perspective. It is a more

philosophical look at the issue in the form that I said earlier, in other

words, in explaining plurality by the nature of plurality, regardless of

the religion, sect, or doctrine to which we belong. As the phenomenologists

say, we should set our own beliefs aside; that is, we should disregard them

for now and discuss the issue in more general terms. Then we use the answer

that we find in a general discussion to find an answer within religion,

because based on the principles that I have stated in "Contraction and

Expansion," the external bases of our religion totally affect our judgment

within our religion, and while our view about generalities has not reached

any conclusion in regard to particular issues, we will not come to a clear

judgment. For this reason, I suggested that, in regards to plurality, we

argue that, firstly, we accept the plurality that exists and secondly,

clarify the "reasons" and "causes" of this plurality. The reason that I put

my finger on the reasons and causes is that they are different and have

different rules.

The cause becomes meaningful because of the existence of the "object,"

and reason is based on claim. Causes are non‑epistemological and

non‑reasoning factors, which consist of training, environment of birth,

life geography, natural evolution, social and hereditary conditions,

interests, selfishness, ignorance, and the like and are involved in the

creation of human affairs. In other words, if we ask, for what reason have

people turned different colors? For what reason have they different races

and languages? We must give causal answers, and reasoned answers are

irrelevant. But when it is religion"s turn, when it is the turn of

philosophical doctrines, one should ask both about causes and reasons. I

have also stated in "Direct Paths" that the religion of the majority of the

people (public) has a cause and not a reason. In other words, before

engaging in a scholarly and philosophical evaluation and before studying

the reasons for the truth of various religions, to examine the truth of

various religions, the public becomes interested in a religion or a sect

that the environment dictates without any evaluation. Changing one"s

religion is very rare and exceptional. Hence, plurality in the religion of

the public is due to the plurality of causes, and as long as there is

plurality of causes (that is, the environment, education, imitation...),

the plurality of religions (or plurality of belief in religions) will also

exist. Now we get to the religion of the elite (scholars), which has

reasons and not causes, and each group of them considers itself right and

the other wrong.

Now, here, the question is raised that, if the scholars, theologians,

and intellectuals of a nation are involved in the reasons (and neglect the

causes and are not under the influence of the environment, imitation, and

inculcation), how is it that all have invariably remained in their

different and contradictory positions, and none of the scholars of various

nations have agreed to give up their reasons and admit that they are wrong?

How is it that the Jews continue to insist on the reasoning that Judaism is

right, the Christian scholars insist on the reasoning of the truth of

Christianity, the Shi"ite scholars insist on the truth of

Shi"ism, the Sunni scholars on the truth of Sunnis, etc., and this

quarrel has not ended? Since both sides of the quarrel have heard each

other"s reasoning, and because they are wise and scholars, they should

go, listen, and submit to the truth. When we get there, the issue becomes

very difficult, and the point is raised that I referred to earlier. We must

explain our theory about wisdom. If we do not have a clear opinion on

wisdom (and thereby on truth), we cannot take any steps, because we are not

discussing the wise of the nation. The wise of the nation consist of

[different] groups, some of whom have accepted Judaism as truth and

maintain that other religions and sects are wrong, and others who belong to

Christianity, etc.

Here, we have two ways. One is to say that these reasons should be

changed to causes, that is, the reasons are all fabricated and are all

ideas and ideologies. This is what the post‑modernists say, which has old

roots. In other words, our intellect is controlled by our emotions. Our

intellect is controlled by our selfishness, interests, and belongings and

is captive to what is inculcated in us, does not have the power and courage

to examine the reasons impartially, it has a historical nature, it is

affected by ideology, etc. This is a lengthy argument. If we make such a

statement, firstly, we have offered our theory in regards to wisdom and,

secondly, we have clarified our duty and situation, that we are like

others, indeed no different from others. When reasoning is changed to

cause, it means that the intellect has no authority, and what operates and

affects human judgment are causes, such as profit or political and

ideological geography. As Hafez says:

Do not frighten us of the prohibition by wisdom, bring wine/ Because

that policeman has no authority in our land.

If we change the reasons into causes, we go back to the previous

position, and pluralism becomes inevitable. Everyone has as much right as

the next to stay within his particular beliefs, and no one can boast of

superiority over another, claim to be more right than another, or say: I am

superior to you because I have more correct beliefs and stronger reasoning.

In fact, the elite become like the public, only a bit more complex.

But if we do not have such an opinion with regard to intellect and do

not change the reasons to causes, in that case, we must say why the wise of

the nation, despite hearing the statements of the rivals, continue to

insist on their own ideas, and no reason has replaced another. It is here

that some have reached the opinion that the work of the wise in the world

in regards to religion has reached "equality of reasons." This is also a

sort of opinion. This is the same opinion that Kant reached in metaphysics.

He said, in metaphysical issues, that the work of the intellectual has

reached "equality of reasons." What does "equality of reasons" mean? It

means that the reasons of both sides are equally strong, so that neither

can overpower the other and force it out. What was Kant"s opinion

about the incidence or precedence of the world?

He said: If the metaphysicians and philosophers argue until Judgment

Day about the incidence or precedence of the world, neither side can

completely overpower the other, or, in other words, prove 100 percent that

the world is a precedent or an incident, that it does or does not have a

beginning. It has come down to the equality of reasons. The same is true

about the finite or the infinite nature of other dimensions and problems of

metaphysics, as stated in Kant"s work, and it was one of the basic

points that Kant believed. I am not now discussing the opinion of Kant. I

have just mentioned this as an example, to identify what the issue is

about. Kant believed that the secret behind the fact that the

metaphysicians have not been able to overpower each other is that there is

a problem in the operation of the intellect when it steps into the arena of

metaphysics. There, it enters an arena that it should not, and hence it

cannot prove everything 100 percent. Therefore, every opinion reaches

equality and equilibrium with the opinion of the rival. In other words, it

reaches equality of reasons. There are the antimonies of Kant (the debating

opinions of both sides, as our own philosophers say, this is the wooden leg

of the rationalists). Five centuries before Kant, Mowlavi also had the same

opinion about determinism and fatalism. He said:

Between the determinists and fatalists/ Continue to argue until the

Day of Judgment

Since the bad practice of the teacher of that school/ Is to trains them

with reasons.

He considered this constant argument as the will of God. Now, if in

the arena of religion we say that the wise in the nation and the

theologians of every religious sect have reasons for their beliefs and have

not pursued selfishness and profit in these reasons (because, if we say so,

reason is changed to cause), and have been only seekers of truth and have

examined the reasons with impartiality and have still remained with their

own beliefs, we would have to reach the conclusion that, hence, different

conflicting reasons have not been able to overpower one another and,

therefore, none of the rivals has changed his position.

Look at Ghazali. Ghazali was a person who doubted everything,

according to what he writes in AL‑MONAQEZ MEN AL‑ZALAL. He says: A day

arrived at the age of 38 when I doubted everything; it was a sincere and

impartial doubt. I seized myself and questioned my life until I reached the

most obvious beliefs I had. It is obvious that he was facing a very clear

and naked Descartian doubt. As he puts it: For six months, I was ill and

bedridden at home and would not say a word. They brought a physician, but

the physician was helpless in trying to treat me. I knew myself what my

ailment was. My ailment was internal struggle, the temptation that had

befallen me about the most obvious of the obvious. This life of mine, the

status and glory that I have, being a teacher at the Nezamiyyeh University,

being esteemed by the sultan and calif, is this the best way to live? It

began from here and went to my beliefs, to my being an Ash"ari, a

Sunni, to my opinions on religious jurisprudence, principles, and theology.

And it went further back, until it reached the obvious, that there exists a

world, that it is day now, that the sun that shines, and why do I believe

in them? He says that the doubts had overcome him such that he put all

aside and left his surroundings and place, sat in seclusion for 10 years,

and decided what he had to do. After 10 years, he returned and was still a

full‑fledged Ash"ari Sunni. In other words, if we do not say that he

was overcome by selfishness and interests (and we do not), and if we say

that he had engaged in an impartial, sincere, God‑seeking investigation,

you can see that ultimately he reached the point where he was, more or

less, in the beginning. Of course, the elements of piety and morality had

increased in him, and his way of life had changed, and he pursued piety and

seclusion from the world. But in regards to official and orthodox beliefs,

he was more or less what he was before he left Baghdad, and his work quite

shows this.

Among us Shi"ites, no one like Ghazali, with such grandeur, is

found in history. But, for instance, Mr. Motahhari also, after studying all

that philosophy, theology, reported sayings, religious jurisprudence, and

principles, remained the same Shi"ite that he was from the beginning

of his life. He did not change.

Now, if we believe that there are, in fact, great scholars and wise

people who wash their hands of all interests and seriously, out of fear of

God and seeking the truth, engage in studying the various reasons regarding

the truth or falsehood of various religions and ultimately reach the point

that the religion that we have ourselves and have had from the beginning is

true, in other words, the Shi"ites say Shi"ism is right, the

Sunnis say Sunnism is right, the Buddhists say Buddhism is right, etc., in

this case, our theory about the intellect brings us to the point that, if

religion is a zone into which when intellect steps, it is deflated, it

faces equality of reasons, in other words, Kant"s opinion about

metaphysics. This is one possible interpretation of the actual pluralism

that has occurred with regard to religion. Other interpretations believe in

the finality of wisdom, changing it to causes, and the absolute domination

of emotions and interests over human intellect, or the absence of intellect

from the scene. In any case, in interpreting the existing plurality, we

have only two ways, either an interpretation based on cause or one based on

reason. The causal interpretation does not leave anything at all. All are

dependent on a series of intentions and emotions, they choose religion

blindly, and their intellect is controlled by their interests. The path of

reason gives intellect a line of independence, but ultimately reaches

equality of reasons. This is the interpretation of pluralism that can be

stated. Now, someone who would say, only we are right, and the rest are

right only to the degree of their proximity to us and false at the level of

their distance from us, and that ultimately, we have the greatest share of

the truth and others are false, must also make it clear how people"s

intellect works, that the majority of the people in this world believe in

falsehood and do not understand that what they believe is false. Also, he

must make it clear how all that lasting falsehood has appeared, taken a

position in the intellect, and has not left. When this is our theory about

the intellect of the majority of the people, that they believe in falsehood

and do not want to give it up, this theory of intellect will also come back

to haunt us. Gradually, we will be asked, how did you understand all these

truths so easily and did not do anything, while all the rest of the people

are engulfed in misguidance?

No matter what theory you offer about the intellect, it will also

include you. In other words, it is a strategic theory; it is a reflexive

theory, as the Westerners say, that is, it comes back to itself. In other

words, our opinion about the intellect will also include our own intellect.

In my opinion, this is the battle scene in which we must fight. Beyond

this, every sect will remain with its particular opinions and understanding

of its own truth. Saying that Shi"ism is right and others, depending

on their distance from and closeness to it have truth, is a theological

argument, is the position of every Shi"ite, and is not related to

pluralism at all. Of course, every believer has this opinion about himself.

Whether or not we are Shi"ites, we must discuss the issue of pluralism

independently from our theological and sectarian opinions. To say that they

have some of the truth because they have those in common with us is again

not the answer to the question. The issue of pluralism concerns the

differences and not the common grounds. In other words, it is when there is

multiplicity and not sameness.

I should also add that the issue of pluralism does not mean that all

are right. This is an understanding that some have acquired, and

unfortunately it is a false one. In the article on "Direct Paths," I have

clearly stated and I will also repeat here: The discussion on pluralism is

to explain the plurality that exists in the world, whether this plurality

is in the truths or it is a plurality that contains a mixture of truth and

falsehood. A plurality has appeared in the world. This plurality should be

explained, and these explanations should be either with cause or reason.

But to say that there is falsehood in this plurality is beyond argument.

Certainly, there are false doctrines in the world. Undoubtedly, as Mowlavi

says:

He who says all are right is a fool/ He who says all are fa